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PROLOGUE: LAWYERS AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF AUTHORSHIP
If one of our students were to pass off someone else’s work as his
or her own and we were to discover that misrepresentation, the penalties would be harsh. But as lawyers, we hold ourselves to less rigorous standards for plagiarism than those to which we hold our students. Where research assistants make significant contributions to
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
** Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. We are indebted to David Keeney, Robert Mezey, and
Craig Hoffman for conversations about linguistic theory, authorship styles, and how one
might track and measure style differentials in judicial opinions as opposed to fiction or poetry. We are grateful to the computer scientists and programmers at InApp in India, including Satish Babu, M.C. Jayakrishnan, and R.V. Suchitra, for their innovations in designing programs to run standard authorship tests on judicial opinions. For conversations
about the ideas here, we also thank Gail Agrawal, Scott Baker, Michael BeVier, Devon
Carbado, Adrienne Davis, Susan French, Dennis Hutchinson, Edeanna Johnson, Kimberly
Krawiec, Richard Posner, Un Kyung Park, Tom Rowe, Michael Solimine, David Vladeck,
and P. Vijaykumar. Our thanks also go to Associate Dean Jim Rossi and the Law Review
editors at the Florida State University College of Law for organizing this Symposium. The
library staffs at the University of Virginia School of Law and the Georgetown Law Center
provided us with invaluable research assistance. Chris Knott and Kent Olson were especially generous with their assistance. Finally, we owe a debt to Lee Epstein for giving us
the initial impetus for the project.
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their professors’ papers and sometimes even draft large sections of
those papers, they are rarely given anything more than an acknowledgement in a footnote.1 Law firm partners, we suspect, think nothing of asking junior associates to draft entire articles or book chapters and then send them out under their name (again, often without
acknowledgement of the flunky’s authorship). And then there is the
matter of judges. Law clerks are said to draft the vast majority of
opinions for judges. Yet, if one were to ask most lawyers and judges
whether authorship credit should be given to the individual clerks,
they would in all likelihood think the question ridiculous. Why do we,
as lawyers, consider proper attribution of authorship so important
for our students and so unimportant for ourselves?2
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal judges enjoy a large amount of discretion in how they go
about writing opinions. Once a judge is assigned an opinion, the
judge may choose to write the opinion alone, doing both the research
and writing without any assistance. Judges may also turn to their
clerks to help research relevant law or to draft parts of the opinion.
Some judges may allow clerks to draft entire opinions, while they
themselves contribute only a light editorial overview. Commentators
have discussed the practice of delegating significant portions of the
opinion-writing task to clerks, and more than a few have criticized
it.3 But no one seems to know exactly how much delegation goes on;
1. Law professors, their misuse of sources, and failures to properly attribute credit have been
in the news lately. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lauren A.E. Schuker, Prof Admits to Misusing Source,
HARV. CRIMSON ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2004, at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=503493 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as making the justificatory point that although the
rules governing plagiarism by undergraduates are clear (and harsh), the norms of attribution
and citation in the legal profession—where judges frequently rely on lawyers’ briefs and clerks’
memoranda in drafting opinions—are less clear); Sara Rimer, When Plagiarism’s Shadow Falls
on Admired Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at B9 (discussing criticisms of Harvard Law
Professors Laurence Tribe and Charles Ogletree Jr.).
2. See Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: Mixed Messages for Law Students, 100 DICK. L. REV. 677 (1996) (discussing the mixed messages about plagiarism that
law professors and legal professionals send to law students).
3. For examples of works discussing the practice of delegating to law clerks, see
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994); JONATHAN
MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 9-11 (2002); WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE
OPINION OF THE COURT 42-45 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-59 (1996); David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236, 238 (1986); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers
or Agents? What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at
the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 200-06 (2000); J. Daniel Mahoney,
Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 332-34, 338-44 (1988); David
McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
509, 555-67 (2001); Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving
Justice in the Media Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621 (1999); Marvin E. Frankel, A Matter of
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994, at E15; Alain L. Sanders, Putting a Thumbprint on
History, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 75. Going back further in time, see THE FORGOTTEN

2005]

WHICH JUDGES WRITE THEIR OWN OPINIONS

1079

commentators rely on anecdotes, rumors, and, at best, informal surveys.4
In prior work, we asked why, in selecting Supreme Court Justices,
there was little attempt to use the available data on the relative performances of federal circuit court judges (the primary pool from
which Supreme Court Justices are chosen).5 In this Essay, we ask
why few have attempted to provide a systematic analysis of authorship patterns among federal circuit court judges. We use generic
techniques from computational linguistics, as well as several methods tailored for the judicial setting, to explore both the desirability
and feasibility of determining the authorship of judicial opinions.
Information about the production process (as opposed to information about the end product alone) can be useful in decisions regarding
judicial promotion. Whether a particular judge expends effort in authoring her own opinions may have bearing on how suited the judge
is for elevation to a higher court, including the Supreme Court.
Knowing whether individual judges use their scarce time to manage
their clerks’ writing or to engage in the writing task themselves may
help determine whether there is a need for more judges and resources for the judiciary. If we observe that a spike in the volume of
cases coincides with judges suddenly placing greater reliance on their
clerks to write opinions, we might want to support an expansion of
the federal judiciary. Authorship information may also help identify
judges who are no longer able or willing to perform their tasks adequately. Once identified, peer pressure and other forms of public opprobrium may lead the judges to either increase their activity level or
MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR’S
WASHINGTON (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002); Chester A. Newland,
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299, 312-16
(1961); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 238 (3d ed. 1975) (quoting
Dean Acheson on his clerkship experience with Justice Brandeis); DREW PEARSON &
ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 109 (1936) (discussing Justice Harlan Stone’s use of
his secretary during his drafting process). The most recent and most serious attempt to
systematically survey former Supreme Court law clerks about their involvement in the
opinion-writing process is contained in the forthcoming book, ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L.
WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APPRENTICE: LAW CLERKS AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at ch. 5, at 36, on file with authors) (“Nineteen percent of the clerks said
that their justice made revisions in most cases. Seven percent said that their justice only
changed clerk-written drafts in some cases and four percent said that revisions were made
in few or no cases. What is striking from these results is that thirty percent of clerks had
their drafts issued without modification, as opinions by their justice at least some of the
time.”).
4. As the reader will later see, the criticism about the reliance on anecdote, rumor,
and informal surveys is something that our project is also subject to since we needed some
baseline piece of information about “true” authorship levels to test out various authorship
testing methods. The goal, however, is to develop a set of methods of testing authorship
such that reliance on these often nonverifiable methods can be reduced.
5. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004).
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retire. Law students applying for judicial clerkships will find it useful to know whether their potential employer does her own writing or
delegates it all to her clerks. And—highly relevant from our perspective as researchers—authorship information has the potential to improve academic research on judicial behavior.
Part II of this Essay sets out a framework to explore whether it is
worthwhile to investigate which judges write their opinions. We explore whether there is societal value in knowing information about
the input levels that society’s agents (in this case, the judges) put
into the production process (the product being judicial opinions).
A variety of techniques may be employed to determine the authorship of opinions. Part III sets out tests to determine the viability of
these techniques. We use the limited existing information on authorship—a handful of judges such as Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Michael Boudin participate more actively in the writing of
their opinions than do most other judges6—to test how well the different authorship tests perform in distinguishing such judges.
Our sample pool consists of all circuit court judges who were both
active and under the age of sixty-five as of May 2003 and had been
on the bench for the period from January 1, 1998 to December 31,
2000.7 For each judge in the sample, we selected opinions for analysis
at random from those generated during the three-year sample period.
Based on this sample, we report that the generic tests drawn from
computational linguistics fail to distinguish Posner, Easterbrook, and
Boudin as judges most likely to author their opinions. The generic
tests, however, do not control for the subject matter of specific opinions. The common phrases used in opinions of a specific genre (for
example, administrative law opinions) will cause the generic methodologies to treat all such opinions as more likely to be by the same
author, even if different authors actually wrote the opinions. If the
randomly selected opinions for one judge are all of the same subject
matter but those for another judge are not, this factor alone may lead

6. Several commentators have remarked on the writing practices of Judges Posner
and Easterbrook. See Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial
Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73, 74 n.12 (2004); Martha Middleton, Shaping a Circuit
in the Chicago School Image, NAT’L L.J., July 20, 1987, at 1 (discussing Easterbrook and
Posner). Informal conversations with a number of other judges and former law clerks confirmed that Judges Posner and Easterbrook author all of their own opinions. Many also
mentioned Judge Boudin as someone who authored most of his own opinions. Other judges
were also mentioned, albeit less frequently, as authoring substantial portions of their opinions. We use Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin—those judges with the highest a priori likelihood of self-authorship—to calibrate the effectiveness of our authorship methodologies.
7. We generated much of this dataset in our earlier article ranking judges based on
judicial performance. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5. To take advantage of some of the
data collected for that project, we restrict our analysis to the same pool of judges here.
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the generic authorship tests to give the first judge a higher selfauthorship score.
We also provide more customized tests designed to control, at
least in part, for the subject matter of judicial opinions. Using these
tests, we are able to distinguish our test judges—Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin—as ranking consistently high in terms of selfauthorship of judicial opinions. Part IV concludes and provides possible extensions of the authorship methodology.
II. THE UPSIDES AND DOWNSIDES TO DETERMINING JUDICIAL
AUTHORSHIP
The production of judicial opinions is a joint venture between the
judges and their staffs—for purposes of opinion writing, the law
clerks. The outside world sees the end product in the final opinion
that appears in West’s case reporters. Outsiders cannot distinguish
the contributions of the various participants. For each opinion, only
the primary writing judge is identified (for an appellate opinion, the
other judges on the panel are also identified as secondary participants, but their relative involvement is not specified).
Lore has it that many opinions are drafted primarily by the
judge’s law clerks and sometimes even by staff attorneys. Such delegation may help judges handle their ever-increasing caseloads.8 At
the other extreme, there are some judges who, despite the caseloads,
are reputed to take complete responsibility for opinion writing (for
example, Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, who seem to be
able to do this and more9). Further, occasions may arise when the
other judges on the panel draft significant portions of the opinion.
But the involvement of these subsidiary coauthors is never identified.
In addition, norms of appropriate behavior mean that the clerks
rarely reveal what occurred in their judges’ chambers; the information the clerks possess about relative responsibility for the various
opinions is seldom reported in any public and verifiable manner.10
8. See Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have
Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 944-45 (1995) (noting that growth in
caseload has led to an increase in the number of law clerks and in the amount of work
delegated to them); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274
n.3 (1996) (citing materials that document the increase in judicial caseload).
9. See supra note 6.
10. When clerks do reveal the goings-on in their judges’ chambers, they can sometimes receive considerable criticism. A recent example is the criticism that was leveled at
Edward Lazarus’ Closed Chambers, a memoir of his year on the Supreme Court clerking
for Justice Blackmun. See Kenney, supra note 3 (discussing some of the criticism). Prior to
that, there was criticism of the many law clerks who spoke to Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong when they were researching their book on the workings of the Court, The
Brethren. See George Gold, Loose Tongues: How Stone Cautioned Clerks, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1985, at 28; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 336.
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The agency concept provides a useful framework for thinking
about the judicial production problem. Judges are agents who perform a set of tasks, which include producing judicial opinions, for the
public (the principal in the relationship). A variety of consumers—
lawyers, law students, litigants, researchers, and other judges,
among others—use these judicial opinions to understand the law. In
order to perform their tasks, judges are authorized to employ a set of
subsidiary agents (law clerks and staff attorneys), who are hired, supervised, and evaluated by the judges themselves. Society’s goal as
the principal is arguably to ensure that the judges produce at maximal potential, while at the same time providing for the judges’ independence.
Ordinarily, principals attempt to monitor the conduct of their
agents. If the agents do not work hard enough or produce highquality products, they get fired (or, in the case of politicians, they get
voted out of office). Since society wishes to ensure the independence
of federal judges, however, they are provided with virtually ironclad
job security and fixed salaries. These elements of job security and
fixed incomes mean that the public has relatively few levers with
which to incentivize the judges; for the most part, judges do their
work because they want to. It may appear pointless to inquire into
judges’ relative levels of involvement in the production of opinions.
Indeed, that view may be one reason why such information thus far
has not been collected.
As illustrated by the materials mentioned above, the one context where there has been
some minimal revelation of the levels of delegation to law clerks is the Supreme Court.
Even here the information is highly imperfect, often a function of clerk reconstructions
in contexts where the explicit goal is to praise the Justice or journalistic reports about
high profile cases resting on undisclosed sources. But at least there is some information.
Plus, to the extent that some former Justices have (a) opened their papers to the public
and (b) kept accurate records on clerk-judge communication, researchers have a starting
point to try and determine the level of clerk delegation. Among the prominent recent examples along these lines are the Legal Affairs article by David Garrow criticizing the
amount of delegation of power by Justice Blackmun to his clerks (especially later in his
career) and the Vanity Fair exposé, following the 2000 election, that used information
from law clerks to construct a story about how the decision was made. See David Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2005, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2005/feature_garrow_mayjun05.msp; David
Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310. For examples of former law clerks writing about their Justices, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. (1994); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT
CLERK’S VIEW (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1709 (1986); Anne M. Coughlin, Writing for Justice Powell, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 541
(1999); James L. Volling, Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered, 22
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 39 (1996); and Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron
White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 349. The precise contours of what can and cannot be revealed by
former clerks, however, seems to be unclear. That lack of clarity of the disclosure rules,
when combined with the fondness (or fear) that most clerks have for their judges, we suspect, keeps most clerks from going on the record with information about the authorship
practices in their judges’ chambers.
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In Part II.A, we put forward the claim that a better understanding of the level of judicial input into the opinion-writing process can
potentially help the management of judicial agents in at least three
circumstances: deciding on promotion when the quality of the final
output is hard to evaluate, determining incentives for the judges as
part of a judicial opinion production team, and assessing how best to
allocate resources to the judiciary. We also identify others who may
find knowledge on authorship useful: researchers studying judicial
behavior, law students entering the judicial clerkship market, and
those considering how much to rely on the opinions of specific judges.
Having considered the upsides, in Part II.B we note possible
downsides to the project that colleagues have mentioned to us. These
are the danger of improper negative inferences and the problem of
imperfect measurement.
A. Upsides
1. Promotions and the Quality of Judicial Output
Information on input into the production process can assist in the
evaluation of the quality of a final product where such quality is difficult to observe directly. For many products, such as legal and medical services, product quality is hard to measure. When a lawyer loses
a case or a transaction fails to be completed, it is difficult to know
whether the result should be attributed to the lawyer or to other factors. If a patient’s health does not improve under a doctor’s care, does
this reflect the doctor’s failure to deliver competent medical care or
the patient’s own initial health condition?
Where the final output is difficult to evaluate, another solution is
to look to inputs.11 For example, the difficulty in evaluating lawyers’
product is often given as a reason for why lawyers bill by the hour.12
If one can know the levels of effort and skill a lawyer brings to the
production process, one can determine whether the bad outcome was
the product of inadequate effort and skill, some other factor, or random chance. While doctors are typically not paid on an hourly basis,
information on how much attention and effort a doctor vests in a particular patient is likely to be relevant to any potential medical malpractice claim against that doctor.

11. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS 20 (1995).
12. There has been considerable debate over whether hours billed serves as a good
measure of lawyer performance (or, put differently, an effective means of monitoring). See
Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical
Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing the monitoring literature in the law firm context).
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In earlier work, we suggested that one way to evaluate the quality
of a judicial opinion was to look at citation rates.13 Citation rates,
however, are an imperfect measure because they are affected by a
number of factors other than quality: the subject matter of the case,
the reputation of the circuit, and the reputation of the judge.14 Therefore, knowing the level of the judge’s participation in the production
process supplements information about citation rates. A judge who
rates a low self-authorship score coupled with a low citation rate may
signal her relatively low level of engagement in the judicial process.
Information as to individual inputs into the production process
can also be useful in instances where the employer cares about more
than product quality. An employer might want to know, for example,
whether a particular employee is exerting herself fully or only partially. This is information from which the employer can potentially
infer a number of things, such as the employee’s commitment to the
job, her interest in the project, and her likely effect on her coworkers
(to the extent they take their cues from her).
For some jobs, process—which might be seen to include the
agent’s commitment and dedication to the process—might have an
importance of its own. In the judicial context, commitment and dedication to the task may suggest a concern for justice. Someone who
will work day and night on her task, even if she is not the quickest at
it, may be more likely to produce a just decision than someone who is
highly intelligent and writes quickly but is not willing to spend more
than a few hours a day on a case. The willingness to work hard, we
suggest, may correlate with a judge’s concern that a case be determined in a fair manner (as opposed to a slovenly willingness to decide the case more randomly). Achieving justice, vague and amorphous a concept as it may be, may be more important to society than
ensuring that judges write high-quality opinions.15 The same kind of
argument can be made with respect to other abstract concepts such
as honesty and integrity.16

13. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 34, 48-61.
14. There is an extensive literature on the pitfalls and benefits of using citation rates
as a measure of quality. For discussions, see Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation
Counts in Judgments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (1993); Choi
& Gulati, supra note 5, at 48 n.38, 54-55; William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998); and
Russell Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and if So, Can We Measure Their
Performance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1299 (2005).
15. See John V. Orth, Judging the Tournament, Jurist (Apr. 15, 2004), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/choi-gulati-orth-taha.php.
16. For example, one could question the honesty and integrity of someone who chose
to exert little effort in making a decision even though the lack of effort made it more likely
that the outcome was more random and only loosely related to the facts of the specific case.
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Consider the problem of deciding judicial promotions. If the job at
the lower level is substantially different from that at the promoted
level, high-quality production at the lower-level job may not predict
high-quality production after promotion. The work of trial judges, for
example, is primarily in the area of trial management, with the occasional authorship of an opinion. Circuit court judges, on the other
hand, focus to a greater extent on the production of judicial opinions.
Where a trial judge is being considered for promotion to a circuit
court position, information about dedication to the job (the inputs)
might be more important than which employee produced higherquality opinions at the lower level (the outputs).
Almost all the candidates given serious consideration for appointment to the Supreme Court tend to have prior judicial experience, most of them on the federal circuit courts of appeals.17 What,
then, if we were to find out that a judge who was a candidate for
promotion to the Supreme Court wrote none of her own lower court
opinions, but instead delegated them all to her law clerks? And what
if there was another candidate who wrote all of her own opinions?
This information may not be dispositive in terms of eliminating the
first candidate, but questions would be raised and inquiries would be
made. If it turned out that the first judge spent a significant portion
of the year skiing, sailing, or rock climbing, the public would probably conclude that this judge was not committed to the job.
On the other hand, it might turn out that this judge, instead of actually writing her own opinions, was spending her time managing
her clerks and training them to write and analyze. If it also turned
out that these clerk-written opinions were considered to be of high
quality by experts, the final evaluation of this candidate might be
positive. This would be especially so if the job at the higher level required even more management and training skills than the lowerlevel job. Indeed, the inability of the other judge to effectively utilize
her clerks in the writing process might be seen by some as a negative
factor in the promotion decision.
The information about the judge’s involvement in the writing process alone is therefore unlikely to be dispositive. It may, however,
lead people to look for other pieces of information so as to be able to
make inferences. Judges themselves may voluntarily reveal more information about their style of decisionmaking in response to objective
information on their involvement in writing opinions. Some evaluators may see direct judicial involvement in the writing of drafts as of
17. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 170 (1999); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of
Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003).
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paramount importance. Others may regard judges as also having a
responsibility to train law clerks. The information that may emerge
on judicial input into the writing may be important to both sets of
evaluators, although it may lead them to different conclusions about
who should be promoted.
2. Fine-Tuning Incentives
A much-discussed question in economics is how to devise solutions
to the “team production” problem.18 The team production problem occurs when production occurs in teams and the relative levels of credit
for the final product are hard to allocate.19 Where individual responsibility cannot be allocated, a free-rider problem may arise whereby
team members have an incentive to shirk.20 There are methods employers use to solve the team production problem, which include internal peer pressure within the team and incentives to members to
monitor and manage the other team members.21
In the case of judicial opinion writing, the judge is the manager.
The judge, who is allocated full credit for the output of her chambers,
has both the ability to monitor subordinates and an incentive to ensure that they work hard. The potential problem, however, is with
the judge. If a judge wishes to shirk, there is no formal mechanism to
penalize her. A judge can monitor clerks and fire them or give them
bad references. But there are few direct mechanisms that enable the
public to monitor and penalize a federal judge.
Informal mechanisms, however, do exist. Judges care about status
and prestige.22 They will care if information is released showing that
some of them demonstrate no involvement in the opinion-writing
process (especially if the data also shows that their colleagues are
highly involved in that process). Information concerning a lack of authorship, when coupled with a low citation rate, may indicate that a
judge is simply not doing a good job, thereby reducing that judge’s
reputation among her peers and the general public. Judges may
demonstrate greater participation in the authorship process to prevent or remedy this situation.
But what if these judges are not good writers? Might not it be better that they remove themselves from the writing portion of the pro18. The classic papers on the team production problem are Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972), and Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324
(1982).
19. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 18, at 779.
20. Id. at 780.
21. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (describing the literature on the team production problem).
22. Smyth, supra note 14, at 1306-07 nn.39-42 (citing support on the point).
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ject? The point is a fair one, but it leads to a more important point:
the motivation of politicians. Once a judge who has no skill at writing
is appointed, there may be a valid argument that the judge should
not be compelled to participate in the writing process.23 But writing
skills and the willingness to write opinions should be at least two of
the criteria for appointing a federal judge. And if someone who lacks
those basic characteristics is appointed, the blame should fall on the
politicians who made the appointment. If politicians are penalized for
bad appointments on basic matters such as writing skills, they may
be discouraged from using judicial appointments as political favors or
from allowing their choice to be determined on the basis of litmus
tests; for example, a judge’s likely vote on issues such as abortion
and the death penalty. Politicians may then in fact focus on more
mundane, yet fundamental, matters such as writing skill.
Another indirect incentive exists. Like the rest of us, judges become ill, old, and sometimes uninterested in their jobs. Being a judge,
however, brings status, power, and guaranteed income. There is the
danger that a judge who is beyond the point of being able or willing
to perform the job will be tempted to eschew retirement.24 So long as
the judge has able law clerks, casual observers on the outside will
find it difficult to detect the drop in performance.25 It is likely that
the law clerks and the other judges will be able to observe when the
judge is not able to perform adequately, but while there may be internal grumblings in the courthouse, this information will rarely find
its way to the general public.26 We assume that there is a strong social norm against the disclosure of such information.
If, however, information is available as to judicial input into the
writing process, any significant drop in interest or capability will result in public pressure for the judge to retire. For example, it is likely
that no litigant wants a case to be decided by a senile or otherwise
absent judge. And while the law clerks making decisions for these
23. Alternatively, some might argue that judges who are not good writers are precisely the ones who should be incentivized to write more so that they learn to become better writers. In his diary for the online magazine, Slate, Judge Posner writes:
Most judges nowadays, because of heavy caseloads, delegate the writing of their
judicial opinions to their clerks. It’s a mistake on a number of grounds: The
more you write, the faster you write; only the effort to articulate a decision exposes the weak joints in the analysis; and the judge-written opinion provides
greater insight into the judge’s values and reasoning process and so provides
greater information—not least to the judge.
Richard Posner, Diary: A Weeklong Electronic Journal, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2002), at
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060621&entry=2060676.
24. Cf. Smyth, supra note 14, at 1301-03 (pointing to evidence suggesting that judicial
retirement rates respond to changes in incentives, such as pension levels).
25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 112 (1995).
26. Supreme Court Justices are perhaps an exception to the rule, as we see from the
rumors about Justice Thurgood Marshall. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Our
primary interest in this Essay, however, is in the less visible lower court judges.
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absent judges may have done well on their law school exams, the litigants might prefer to have their cases decided by judges who have at
least some meaningful experience in the world rather than by students fresh out of law school.
The question that remains is as follows: Would disclosure of this
information have any effect on a particular judge, a superannuated
one for example? We suspect it would. While there are few external
sources of pressure that can be brought to bear on a judge, status,
power, and prestige are all a function of the public’s perception of
that person. If the public begins to lose confidence in the judge because of evidence that her ability to write has declined, the judge
may consider either increasing her effort or retiring.
3. Allocation of Resources
The determination of resource allocation for the federal judiciary
is made by the legislature. Given that there are no meaningful competitive forces to tell the legislature when the production process is
faulty, the legislature itself has to collect the necessary information
to make such evaluations. For example, it is well documented that
there has been a dramatic explosion in the caseloads carried by federal judges over the past few decades.27 The number of judges, however, has not kept pace with the increased workload.28 This disparity
has led some to call for more judgeships;29 these calls have, in turn,
been countered by others.30
One element in the argument that more judges are needed has
been that judges today, unlike judges decades ago, are forced to turn
to law clerks, staff attorneys, and other shortcuts to enable them to
tackle their expanded caseloads.31 Skeptics, however, say that the
caseloads are not so large as to prevent existing judges from tackling
them. Some of the questions in the debate might be answered by data
27. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 13-17 (1998); see also Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685 (2000) (discussing the caseload explosion and the responses of the courts of appeals); Lauren K.
Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3 (describing and critiquing the methods judges have used to deal with increased caseloads).
28. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra
note 27, at 14.
29. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges,
Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial
Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (1993).
30. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the
Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1173-74 (1994) (expressing the concern that a significant increase in the size of the federal judiciary will hurt collegiality); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639,
1675 (2003) (agreeing with Judge Wilkinson on the collegiality point).
31. See sources cited supra note 8.
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that would indicate whether judicial involvement in the writing process has decreased in direct correlation with the increase in
caseloads over the past several decades.
Court administration can also be helped in other ways. Along with
the explosion in caseload, there has been an increase in the complexity and volume of many areas of federal regulation.32 In order to
tackle this increased complexity and volume, judges may be focusing
more attention on certain types of cases while delegating others. If
certain types of cases—for example, immigration, social security, securities regulation, or habeas cases—are consistently delegated to
the clerks or the staff attorneys (as measured through a low judge
self-authorship score), such evidence supports the argument that
these specific types of cases deserve a separate set of specialized
courts with expert judges, much like the U.S. Tax Court.33
4. Research on Judicial Behavior
Perhaps the most immediate application of information on authorship rates is improvement of the quality of research on judicial
behavior. Authorship rates can be used as an explanatory variable in
regressions that seek to explain a large number of outcome variables.

32. On the emergence of the regulatory state and the accompanying enormous expansion in federal regulation (and judicial interpretations of those regulations), see Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
33. We are not aware of any systematic research into the question of whether there is
a greater use of clerks in some substantive areas of the law, although it strikes us that this
is an important area of research. Cf. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5,
at 38-39) (finding some evidence that Justices were more likely to make substantial revisions to draft opinions when particular issues were involved). There are statements by
commentators that suggest that the level of clerk and staff attorney usage is much higher
in unpublished opinions. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1995) (noting that clerks—not
judges—generally draft the opinions); Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2004, at 1, 10 (quoting Judge Kozinksi on the matter). If it turns out that certain
categories of cases are more likely to be the subject of unpublished opinions, it should follow that clerk and staff attorney usage will be higher in this category of cases. So, for example, if ninety percent of prisoner or immigration appeals result in unpublished opinions,
it may well be that the major portion of lawmaking in these areas is done by law clerks and
not judges. This is an outcome that strikes us as both unsatisfactory and calling out for reforms such as specialization. For a trenchant critique of the current practices of issuing
unpublished opinions, see Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). On the matter of whether the
federal courts should specialize more in terms of subject matter, see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1995).
Along the lines mentioned above, an empirical study by one of the Symposium participants, James Brudney, finds, among other things, that Supreme Court Justices
seem to apply statutory canons of construction very differently in cases that arise in
the more complex and less high-profile areas of labor law than they do in what might
be seen as the more sexy areas. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=534982.
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Among these outcome variables that researchers might be interested
in better explaining are voting patterns, citation rates and styles, invocation rates,34 publication patterns, independence levels,35 and
choices about styles of argument (for example, whether one prefers
the use of multifactor balancing tests). It may be that whether a
judge writes a significant portion of her opinions is a positive or
negative explanatory factor for one or more of these outcome variables. And that information will advance our knowledge of judicial
behavior. For example, it has been suggested that there are certain
types of cases (perhaps those raising important constitutional questions) where judges are more likely to be actively involved in the
writing and editing of an opinion than other types of cases such as
tax, securities, and bankruptcy.36 If authorship rates for different
opinions were known, this suggestion could be tested. And, as noted
earlier, if it turned out that certain types of cases were consistently
delegated to the clerks, this might be reason enough to think about
specialized courts for those cases. More broadly, if higher levels of
authorship predict higher citation rates (and if citation rates are considered a good proxy for opinion quality), that might suggest that
judges should be given incentives to write more of their own opinions.
If, instead, regressions reveal the reverse effect, judges might be encouraged to write fewer opinions. Alternatively, if citation rates were
seen as an inadequate measure of judicial output quality, one could
use whatever other measure (perhaps a survey of experts) and then
observe whether higher-quality argumentation or explanation in judicial opinions is related to self-authorship rates.37 The point is that
we will not really appreciate the value of knowing authorship rates
34. Invocations involve situations where one judge invokes the name of another judge
when discussing an opinion written by that other judge. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 58.
We consider invocations as a special sign of respect on the part of one judge for another.
See id. at 58-59 (discussing the concept of invocations).
35. One way of measuring judicial independence is to examine whether a judge tends
to side more systematically with judges nominated by a President of the same political
party as the judge in question. See id. at 63. We analyze circuit court judges, active from
1998 to 2000, based on this measure of independence in Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 6167.
36. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 38) (finding that while
most clerks reported that the Justices did not seem to have a particular pattern of deciding
whether to make edits on their drafts, there is some evidence that Justices only substantially revised their draft opinions when particular issues were involved or when the cases
were landmark or important cases).
37. The claim is often made that the discipline of writing out an argument is what
enables the reader to test the logic of the argument. See Posner, supra note 23. Law clerks,
who have been delegated the task of writing an opinion based on an argument that the
judge has suggested, are perhaps less likely to second-guess the argument than the judge
herself. Alternatively, some might think that law clerks are more likely to second-guess
the logic of the argument and point out flaws. Once again, we do not know the answer.
Knowing the information as to which opinions were solely authored versus which ones
were not, however, might help us investigate further.
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until we collect the information and run empirical tests on that information. Finally, assuming the information turns out to be useful,
the authorship data might also be used as an outcome variable itself,
and models could be constructed and tested to determine what factors determine—or at least correlate with—authorship rates.
5. Information for Law Clerks
Information about judicial writing proclivities will undoubtedly
prove useful to law students applying for clerkships. The nature of a
clerkship experience is a direct function of what the judge does. If the
judge researches and writes all of her own opinions, there is little left
for the clerks to do. If the judge is off skiing or at the beach for most
of the year, only calling in on occasion, there will be an immense
amount for the clerks to do and correspondingly little guidance from
the judge.
Clerkships provide value to potential clerks in at least two ways:
training and status. Law clerks are likely to receive minimal training
if their judges are at the beach and have minimal contact with them.
Clerks’ training is also likely to be minimal if their judges are so capable that they do all of their own research and writing.38 What the
clerk who is seeking training wants, then, is the judge whose approach lies between the two extremes. Other clerks, who are seeking
status and the power to shape the law, might want to look for a judge
who delegates the major portion of opinion-writing discretion to the
clerks. Clerks who primarily value leisure might prefer judges who
need no help. Effective information about judges and their proclivities will assist prospective clerks in choosing judges who best suit
their abilities and desires.39

38. For example, clerkships with Justice Douglas were reputed to be among the worst
because, at least in part, he did all his own writing and generally kept his clerks at a distance. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 8) (reporting on interviews with former clerks for Justice Douglas).
39. Internet discussion fora, such as the Greedy Clerks list serve, have at least begun to facilitate the sharing of such information among current and former clerks. See FINDLAW’S INFIRMATION,
GREEDY CLERKS BOARD, at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs.tcl?topic=Greedy%20Clerks
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005). The question whether a particular judge writes her own opinions
has been discussed in at least one thread, which reported that Judges Posner, Easterbrook,
Garza, and Niemeyer are among those federal circuit judges most likely to author their own
opinions. See Posting of Lurks on Sept. 20, 2004 (message no. 25762) (naming Garza), at
http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl; Posting of Lurks on Sept. 20, 2004 (message no. 25768) (naming Posner), at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl;
Posting of Publius Rex on Sept. 20, 2004 (message no. 25769) (naming Niemeyer), at
http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl; Posting of CTA7alum on Sept. 20, 2004
(message no. 25793) (naming Easterbrook), at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetchmsg.tcl.
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But will a more effective process for matching clerks to judges
bring social benefits? In terms of efficiency, it should.40 Clerks who
desire to have a greater input in the writing process will end up with
judges willing to allow their clerks to do so. Likewise, clerks more interested in learning from a judge who actively manages opinion writing will be better able to find such judges. Whether such efficiency
gains are great in magnitude and result in better judicial opinions,
however, is unclear. To the extent the best clerks always opt for
judges with a reputation as “feeder judges” for Supreme Court clerkships, information on authorship will not change the market much
(unless it indirectly affects which judges are the feeder judges).
If clerks, in fact, prefer to work for judges who tend to author
their own opinions or are otherwise more active in the judicial process, an indirect incentive effect on judges is possible. Judges would be
forced to get more involved or accept lower-quality clerks. Alternatively, if judges’ reputations for providing inadequate training hurt
their ability to get good law clerks, they might engage in more training activities for clerks.
6. Informational Benefits to Opinion Users
Knowing an author’s identity serves as a useful shortcut in a variety of settings. For example, in a bookstore, one might use authors’
names to decide which books to scrutinize and which ones to ignore.
Similarly, when one conducts academic research, there are some authors who can be depended on for high-quality work and are therefore likely to be read first. Shortcuts such as an author’s identity are
especially useful when the reader does not have the time or ability to
read all of the available material and evaluate it piece by piece.
Lawyers and judges are faced with this dilemma on a daily basis.
In attempting to construct their arguments, they have to draw from a
vast body of available precedent and decide which arguments to use
and which ones to reject or ignore. If there are multiple opinions that
relate to a particular issue and there is but a limited amount of time
to allocate to the task of analysis, a choice has to be made about
which of those opinions should receive more attention. One of the
variables used to sort through opinions is likely to be author identity.
The dictates of formal precedent aside, opinions by judicial superstars like Hand, Friendly, and Cardozo will probably receive close
scrutiny.
But what if it were known that while Judge Friendly wrote all his
securities law opinions, he delegated his social security opinions to
40. For research into improving the judge-clerk matching process that focuses on aspects of the market other than the one that we mention, see Christopher Avery et al., The
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793 (2001).
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his law clerks? Or, what if Judge Easterbrook was known to write all
his own opinions and Judge Posner was known to write none of his?
Presumably, that would make a difference as well, with opinions authored solely by the judge receiving greater attention and those that
were not receiving less attention.41 To push the argument further, it
would help outsiders decide which opinions to concentrate on if the
opinions were sorted based also on the various coauthors. So, if there
were an opinion on the Second Circuit for which Judge X was the
primary author, but to which Judge Hand had made a sufficient contribution to be named coauthor, the opinion might receive greater authority than if it were to appear under Judge X’s name alone (assuming, for purposes of this point, that Judge X did not have a high reputation). Pushing even further, law clerks could be identified as coauthors or even primary authors when their contributions so warranted. The assumption would still be that the primary decision was
made by the judge. But it would help outsiders who were attempting
to determine how much weight to give a particular opinion to know
who actually wrote the opinion.
Greater information on authorship may also add more credibility
to—or alternatively quash—rumors on the supposed influence of law
clerks in the writing process. There are rumors that Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote very few of his own opinions and that he wrote
fewer and fewer as he advanced in age.42 There are rumors that Jus41. Justice Brandeis famously said that the reason why the Supreme Court’s reputation was so high was that everyone knew that the Justices did all of their own work (a fact
that is undoubtedly not true any longer). See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS
1939-1975, at 172-73 (1980) (describing Justice Brandeis’ views on the need for judges to
author their own opinions). Judge Posner, in turn, explains:
The less that lawyers and especially other judges regard judicial opinions as
authentic expressions of what the judges think, the less they will rely on judicial opinions for guidance and authority. . . . The more the thinking embodied
in opinions is done by law clerks rather than by judges, the less authority opinions will have.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 110 (1985).
42. See Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Ghostwriters on the Court?: A Stylistic Analysis of
U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 172 (2002) (describing the rumors regarding Justice Marshall’s relative lack of involvement in the opinion-writing process). The public articulations of these rumors are contained in BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 258 (1979), and Terry Eastland,
While Justice Sleeps, NAT’L REV., Apr. 21, 1989, at 24. See also Peter Huber, Advice to Justice Thomas, FORBES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 202 (finding that Justice Marshall’s opinions during the 1990 term demonstrated four distinctive styles, corresponding to his four different
law clerks). On the other side, those familiar with the workings of the Court and, in particular, Marshall’s chambers, have disputed the view articulated above. See JUAN
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 370 (1998) (quoting both a
close friend and former law clerk of Marshall); Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the
Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2112 (1992) (stating that while Marshall may have relied
“more heavily on his law clerks for opinion writing than did the other Justices during the
early years of his tenure, . . . his practices were not wildly out of line with those of the others on the Court”).
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tice Kennedy’s opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey43 was the
product of undue influence from one of his liberal clerks.44 And judges
like William Douglas, Learned Hand, and Richard Posner are reputed to have written all their own opinions.45
These rumors may unfairly hurt or benefit a judge’s reputation,
effects that are especially problematic when some of the rumors are
driven by stereotypes based on race and gender. Law clerk denials
and confirmations occur, but these lack credibility since the law
clerks have an incentive to do everything to heighten the reputation
of their judge, because their own status is tied to the status of their
judge.46 If, however, authorship can be determined using credible and
verifiable methods, these rumors can be quashed or confirmed.
B. Downsides
When we began this project, we saw few disadvantages to collecting authorship information on judges. More information, we assumed, was a good thing. But a number of our colleagues, seeing our
inquiry as problematic, disagreed. Their prime objection was that the
venture was a waste of our time and resources because information
about judicial authorship, even if it could be obtained, was useless—
an objection that we hope Part II.A has answered. Below, we tackle
two of the other objections we heard most often.
1. Danger of Unjustified Inferences
One could argue that an implicit message exists in just our attempt to test the degree of self-authorship among judges. Judges who
do not author their own opinions will feel unfairly stigmatized, the
argument goes, when it is not clear that they should. Judging is supposed to be about applying the law to the facts in an impartial and
considerate manner. Whether the articulation of that application is
43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
44. See Richard Lacayo, Inside the Court, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 29; Edward Lazarus, Disturbing Truths, Jurist: Books-on-Law (July 1998), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revjul98.htm. The
claim that liberal law clerks have had excessive influence on the Justices was also famously
made years earlier by Justice Rehnquist (prior to his joining the Court). See Wahlbeck et al.,
supra note 42, at 167. The controversy that ensued led one conservative Senator to ask for
clerk confirmation by the Senate. Id.
45. On Learned Hand’s use of his law clerks in the opinion-writing process, his former
law clerk, Gerald Gunther, wrote: “No clerk for [Learned] Hand ever wrote a single word,
either in producing research memoranda or in drafting opinions. Instead, the Hand-law
clerk relationship was one of extraordinary intellectual intimacy: it consisted entirely of
face-to-face contacts, not any written work.” Gerald Gunther, Reflections on Judicial Administration in the Second Circuit, from the Perspective of Learned Hand’s Days, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 505, 510 (1994). On Posner, see supra note 6. And on Douglas, see Richard
A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27 (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (2003)).
46. See supra note 42 (citing statements by former Marshall clerks).
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self-authored or not is a consideration of minimal value, at best.47
The identity of the author does not matter, and for us to suggest otherwise by making this inquiry is disrespectful.
We disagree. One may not want judicial or author identity to be
relevant, but there is reason to think that it is. Judges have individual preferences and respond to incentives. There is debate about the
degree to which judges, as a specific subgroup, are driven by these
factors, as opposed to other factors such as the norms of their profession or altruism toward society.48 Given that debate, the necessary
next step should be to test the robustness of the competing models,
and that requires collecting information on variables such as authorship.49 It may be that the empirical results will pleasantly surprise
our critics and authorship identity will turn out not to matter. And if
that is the case, there will not be any stigma. On the other hand, if
self-authorship is related to productivity, quality, and other factors of
importance, then a stigma should arguably fall on those judges who
do not author their own opinions.
2. Imperfect Measurement
A second criticism takes aim at our methodology. Our critics point
out that the types of statistical tests that we describe later in the Essay can at best produce an imperfect measure of authorship rates.
Given that judges themselves have perfect information about their
authorship levels, why not simply ask them about their practices?
The point is fair. Judges do know more about their own practices,
and we should try to ask them about what they do. But doing that
alone is unlikely to be sufficient for two reasons. First, judges may
choose simply not to respond to a survey instrument, especially if it
is from some annoying law professor. Indeed, judges seemed irate
when requested to respond to a survey sent out by the Senate’s Judi47. John Orth makes this point in his critique of our prior article where he says that
any evaluation of judges should focus first on the quality of decisions (or justice) from the
perspective of the individual litigants and only then, if at all, on considerations about the
quality and style of the articulation. See Orth, supra note 15.
48. See Smyth, supra note 14, at 1302-09 (describing the debate).
49. There is already a literature on testing the different models of judging in law,
economics, and political science, with contributions to that literature having been made by
participants in this Symposium, including Brudney, Epstein, Farber, Posner, Smyth,
Staudt, and Taha. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015
(2005); Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the
U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court
Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175 (2005);
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); Russell Smyth, supra note 14; Ahmed E. Taha, Information and
the Selection of Judges: A Comment on “A Tournament of Judges,” 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1401 (2005). Our point is that information about authorship rates has the potential to improve those tests.
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ciary Oversight Subcommittee.50 Second, there is a verifiability problem with judges self-reporting their practices. What’s to stop a judge
from saying that she writes all her opinions (whether true or not)?
Judges could ameliorate the verifiability problem somewhat by allowing their clerks free reign to disclose delegation practices. But we
think this unlikely to happen.
Imperfect measures using computational techniques might be able
to partially solve these problems by creating both an incentive to selfreport and a verifiability mechanism. In other words, the revelation
of partial information by an outside source may create an incentive
for the possessor of the true information to fully reveal it, if only to
correct the imperfect impression left from objective data on authorship.51 If the imperfect information is seen as having a high degree of
reliability (for example, it is correct seventy percent of the time),
then that will put pressure on judges who rank low on the imperfect
measure, but whose true scores should be higher, to self-report their
true practices. And to the extent there is a perceived verifiability
problem with self-reporting, the judges may allow for verifiability
through mechanisms like clerk disclosure.
III. TESTING AUTHORSHIP
So far, we have assumed that authorship identity could be determined. In theory it can be, but the task is not straightforward. Indeed, prior attempts at surveys on this very information have revealed little other than the fact that many judges do delegate some
portion of the writing task to their clerks.52 In this Part we describe
50. See infra note 52 (discussing the survey attempt). The Grassley survey may not be
the best example, though. The judges’ annoyance at Senator Grassley’s attempt to survey
them may have been more a product of the somewhat undiplomatic tone and context of
that particular survey attempt. See infra note 52.
51. For more on the argument that objective tournaments may help force participants
to reveal information about themselves, see Scott Baker, Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, The
Rat Race as an Information Forcing Device, 81 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649083.
52. There was a survey attempt directed by Senator Charles Grassley in 1996 as part
of his work as chair of the Senate-Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts. See U.S. SENATE-JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE
COURTS, 104TH CONG. REPORT ON THE JANUARY 1996 JUDICIAL SURVEY (PART I, U.S.
COURTS OF APPEAL) 26-27 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter SURVEY REPORT]. He sent a
survey to all sitting federal judges that inquired about matters such as delegation to law
clerks. See Now the Judges Face the Questions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 8 (providing
the full text of the Grassley questionnaire). The survey results suggested that most judges
did not perceive an inappropriate level of delegation. See SURVEY REPORT, supra, at 26-27.
(reporting that over seventy-five percent of the circuit court judges did not perceive a problem with the extent of delegation to law clerks); Oyez Surveys, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996,
at 3 (reporting that Grassley’s “results show that most judges believe that law clerks do
not play too large a role in judicial decision making”); Deborah Pines & Bill Alden, District,
Circuit Judges Use Senate Survey to Boast, Gripe, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at 1, 4 (reporting that Judge Newman responded to the question of how much he delegated work to law
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our preliminary attempts to determine authorship through other
techniques.
The literature on the question of tracing authorship dates back to
over a century ago. In recent years, these techniques have made it
onto television talk shows and the front page of The New York
Times.53 Stories have appeared about their application in the discovery of a new Shakespeare poem and in a variety of other high-profile
settings, such as unmasking the anonymous author of Primary Colors.54 Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors have also used “forensic linguistics” in both the JonBenét Ramsey murder investigation
and the Unabomber prosecution.55
In attempting to answer these questions and others—such as
whether Shakespeare wrote his plays or if they were really the work
of Marlowe, Bacon, or some other contemporary—scholars have declerks by saying that he does “not believe that law clerks exercise anything that can reasonably be called ‘power’”).
The survey caused considerable displeasure among many judges. See, e.g., Bruce Brown,
Grassley Has Judges Grousing, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 16 (reporting that “Grassley’s crusade has many judges grumbling”); Pines & Alden, supra, at 4 (quoting Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who characterized the survey as potentially “an unwarranted and ill-considered
effort to micromanage the work of the federal judiciary,” and stating that the survey’s inquiry into delegation practices particularly had “raise[d] the ire of judges”). Given this displeasure, the response rate of over fifty percent was surprisingly high—approximately 600
judges returned the surveys. See Pines & Alden, supra, at 4 (reporting that over 600 out of
1148 judges had responded to the survey). Despite the high response rate, neither this nor
other survey attempts have come anywhere close to estimating relative levels of clerk contributions in the different chambers in a meaningful manner. See Wahlbeck et al., supra
note 42, at 168 (making this point about prior survey attempts).
53. See William H. Honan, A Sleuth Gets His Suspect: Shakespeare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1996, § 1, at 1 (discussing Professor Donald Foster’s efforts to trace authorship).
54. Much of the media scrutiny regarding what is sometimes referred to as “forensic linguistics” has centered around the work of Vassar College professor Don Foster. Many of Foster’s
exploits, including those mentioned in the text, are detailed in DON FOSTER, AUTHOR
UNKNOWN: ON THE TRAIL OF ANONYMOUS (2000). For more on Foster’s exploits, including The
New York Times front-page story, his unmasking of Joe Klein for New York Magazine, and his
confrontation with Dan Rather on CBS, see Jamie Allen, On the Trail of a Literary Sleuth,
CNN.COM, Dec. 6, 2000, at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/books/news/12/06/foster.anonymous/.
The discovery of the Shakespeare poem that brought Foster his initial fame, though, was later
recanted by Foster. See William S. Niederkorn, A Scholar Recants on His ‘Shakespeare’ Discovery, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at E1. Stronger evidence pointing to John Ford as the author of
the poem, A Funeral Elegy, was subsequently reported by Professor Gilles Monsarrat. Id. Foster’s error, apparently, was to focus excessively on word usage patterns and not enough on
structural features such as phrase patterns. See id. (reporting criticisms by Cambridge Professor Brian Vickers).
For more sophisticated linguistic treatments of the arguments over the authorship of
Funeral Elegy, see BRIAN VICKERS, ‘COUNTERFEITING’ SHAKESPEARE: EVIDENCE,
AUTHORSHIP, AND JOHN FORD’S FUNERALL ELEGYE (2002); Ward Elliott & Robert Valenza,
Smoking Guns and Silver Bullets: Could John Ford Have Written the Funeral Elegy?, 16
LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 205 (2001); and G.D. Monsarrat, A Funeral Elegy:
Ford, W.S., and Shakespeare, 53 REV. ENG. STUD. 186 (2002).
55. See Allen, supra note 54 (summarizing Foster’s help to the FBI); FOSTER, supra
note 54, at 16-17 (providing a brief discussion of the Ramsey murder investigation); id. at
95-142 (explaining Foster’s contributions to the Unabomber investigation).
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veloped a number of techniques.56 We make use of these techniques
in discerning authorship for judicial opinions. Although some linguistics tools have found their way into FBI investigations and even into
court,57 few legal academics have made any meaningful use of them
in their research on judicial authorship.58 One reason for the lack of
research is resource-related.59 In addition, determining authorship is
difficult without a set of authentic texts for each judge (for example,
texts where it is known to a certainty that the judge is the author)
against which to compare the judicial opinions bearing the judge’s
name.
There has been, however, at least one attempt to determine authorship in the judicial context. Paul Wahlbeck, James Spriggs, and
Lee Sigelman used techniques from computational linguistics to determine the relative levels of delegation of the opinion-writing task to
clerks by Justices Lewis Powell and Thurgood Marshall.60 We consider whether some version of that method could be used to determine authorship patterns for a larger sample of judges.
To get a sense of the difficulty of tackling this question and as a
preliminary test of the effectiveness of standard authorship methodologies in determining judicial opinion authorship, we ran our authorship tests on a sample consisting of opinions for all the active
federal circuit court judges for the period from January 1, 1998 to
December 31, 2000—a total of three years worth of data.
Our tentative conclusion: the ranking task can be accomplished,
but it requires a significant allocation of resources—at least more
than the minimal amounts that law faculty typically use on their pro56. Inquiries into the authorship of Shakespearean texts have been multitudinous.
For a discussion of some examples, see Barron Brainerd, The Computer in Statistical Studies of William Shakespeare, 4 COMPUTER STUD. HUMAN. & VERBAL BEHAV. 9 (1973), and
C.B. Williams, Mendenhall’s Studies of Word-Length Distribution in the Works of Shakespeare and Bacon, 62 BIOMETRIKA 207 (1975). For more on inquiries into the true authorship of the texts we attribute to Shakespeare, see Ward Elliot, The Shakespeare Clinic,
ELLIOT ONLINE, at http://govt.mckenna.edu/welliott/shakes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005),
and THE SHAKESPEARE AUTHORSHIP PAGE, at http://shakespeareauthorship.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
57. See FOSTER, supra note 54, at 95-142 (describing the use of his techniques by both
the FBI and the prosecutors in the Unabomber case); see also Bryan Niblett & Jillian
Boreham, Cluster Analysis in Court, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 175 (describing how the “cluster
analysis” technique is used to verify criminal confession statements).
58. We should note though that at least two sets of legal scholars have discussed forensic linguistics in other contexts. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA,
SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 149-80 (2005) (discussing the
application of authorship attribution research to a wide variety of criminal investigations
and cases); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND
POWER 161-78 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing Donald Foster’s involvement in the JonBenét Ramsey murder investigation).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88 (describing time-intensive nature of our
authorship methodology).
60. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 170-73.
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jects. Moreover, significant “noise” may exist in comparing authorship of different judicial opinions that may make determining the
true level of authorship for a particular set of opinions for any particular judge difficult. Nonetheless, the same reasons we offer in Part
II.A of this Essay to support the value of determining authorship lead
us to believe that more research is warranted in the area.
In Part III.A, we give a thumbnail sketch of the methodology used
for doing authorship testing. In Part III.B, we then examine the
question of how that methodology might be applied to the matter of
ranking judges, and we provide results from generic tests of authorship drawn from computational linguistics. The generic tests perform
poorly in distinguishing judges based on authorship. In Part III.C, we
then report the results from better-tailored tests of authorship for the
judicial context. Tests that control for the subject matter of judicial
opinions perform better in assessing judicial authorship.
A. Tracking Judicial Fingerprints
The basic proposition here is that writers have styles of their own.
Just as all of us have our own styles of walking, talking, singing,
shooting a photograph or movie, throwing a baseball, and playing a
guitar, we also have particular writing styles. Some of us have styles
that are more distinctive than others. This is especially true when we
are experts in a field and, as a result, are extensively active within
the field. Michael Jordan’s style of shooting a basketball, Serena Williams’ style of serving a tennis ball, and Sachin Tedulkar’s style of
hitting a cricket ball are so distinctive that even casual fans are
likely to identify the players from just their playing styles. Our more
literate friends can readily recognize passages from authors such as
Jane Austen, Ernest Hemmingway, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.
Testing authorship by way of an author’s idiosyncratic style requires distilling the basic elements of the style that differ from that
of other authors in order that these basic elements can be used as
identifiers. For example, if one knows that author A is partial to using the word “hath” and intensely dislikes the word “have,” one might
think it unlikely a document that has zero uses of “hath” and multiple uses of “have” belongs to him. The information about author A’s
distinctive style characteristics is combined with information about
the patterns in the document of unknown authorship, and Bayes’
Theorem is used to determine the probability that A authored the
mystery text.61
61. The standard technique to make these probability calculations is to use Bayes’
Theorem. One of the problems with the use of the naïve Bayes model that has been pointed
out is that the calculation assumes randomness (and, of course, words in a text are a function
of each other as opposed to completely independent and random). Nevertheless, despite the
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The problem with this technique is that one has to identify a large
set of unique identifiers (such as uses of “hath” in place of “have”).
Without such a set of identifiers, it becomes difficult to distinguish
authors from one another. Relying on unique stylistic markers also
requires expertise in identifying the author’s style and will work only
for authors who have developed identifiable traits in the first place.
This narrows considerably the usefulness of such techniques. Not all
authors use unique stylistic markers in their writing (Choi and Gulati, for example, are quite mundane in their styles, although they
are both partial to text parentheticals).
More broadly applicable techniques for authorship determination
build on the same basic idea but look to a variety of style patterns
rather than particular identifiers. Here, the premise is that authors’
writings follow patterns. These patterns may be, in part, a function of
stylistic preferences, such as the use of the word “hath.” Patterns
may also consist of the use of a series of more common words and the
order in which such words are used. Rather than look for specific
styles, authorship may be determined through an examination of the
overall frequency of specific words and patterns of words throughout
the entire text.
Word choice patterns (that is, diction) are also likely to be a function of bounded rationality. People engaged in the task of writing,
just as with other tasks, are constrained by their cognitive capacities.
There is likely to be a finite set of words that are part of a single individual’s active vocabulary. One uses these words more often than
other words. Other words, though part of one’s vocabulary, are used
only rarely in one’s own speech or writing yet are immediately recognizable in both the text and speech of others. And then there will be
words the author simply does not know. Individual authors are likely
to exhibit distinct patterns of noun and verb usage, distinct patterns
likely violation of the randomness assumption, the naïve Bayes model appears to perform well.
For discussions of Bayes’ Theorem, see James Joyce, Bayes’ Theorem, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem (last substantive content change Sept. 30, 2003). For a Bayes’ Theorem calculator, see VASSARSTATS,
BAYES’ THEOREM: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES, at http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/bayes.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). On the use of the Bayes model, see FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID
L. WALLACE, APPLIED BAYESIAN AND CLASSICAL INFERENCE: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS (2d ed. 1984). See also Sang-Bum Kim et al., Effective Methods for Improving Naïve
Bayes Text Classifiers, PRICAI 2002: TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7TH PACIFIC RIM
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, TOKYO, JAPAN (M. Ishizuka & A.
Sattar eds., 2002); Andrew McCallum & Kamal Nigam, A Comparison of Event Models for Naïve Bayes Text Classification, in AM. ASS’N FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEARNING FOR TEXT
CATEGORIZATION: PAPERS FROM THE AAAI WORKSHOP, TECHNICAL REPORT WS-98-05, at 41
(1998); Yiming Yang, An Evaluation of Statistical Approaches to Text Categorization, 1 INFO.
RETRIEVAL 69 (1999). More generally, for both a discussion and application of a variety of these
methods of authorship recognition, see Michael G. Farringdon, A Stylometric Analysis, in
MARTIN C. BATTESTIN, NEW ESSAYS BY HENRY FIELDING: HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CRAFTSMAN (1734-1739) AND OTHER EARLY JOURNALISM app. C, at 549-62 (1989).
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for combining words, and distinct patterns of starting and ending
sentences. All of these patterns can translate into frequency of use.
Given a set of authentic texts for any author, a full set of these frequencies can be calculated. These frequencies can then be compared
to the frequency patterns for the document whose authorship is unknown to determine whether the same author wrote the document in
question.62
Among the first serious treatments of the mathematics of word
distributions, to our knowledge, was that by G. Udny Yule in 1938, in
a study of The Imitation of Christ.63 The defining studies in the area,
however, are four studies published in the 1960s: Louis Milic’s tests
of Jonathan Swift’s prose,64 A.Q. Morton and James McLeman’s
study of the Pauline Epistles,65 Alvar Ellegård’s study of the Junius
Letters,66 and Frederick Mosteller and David Wallace’s work on The
Federalist papers.67 The success of these projects and improvements
of computer technology spurred an expansion of the literature on
style statistics in the decades since. For interested scholars, extended
treatments and a steady stream of sophisticated journal articles exist.68

62. See Farringdon, supra note 61 (describing a range of techniques used to determine
authorship). For an overview of the state of authorship attribution studies and the wide
range of techniques in use, see Joseph Rudman, The State of Authorship Attribution Studies: Some Problems and Solutions, 31 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 351 (1998).
63. See Farringdon, supra note 61, at 549-50; see also G. UDNY YULE, THE
STATISTICAL STUDY OF LITERARY VOCABULARY (1944) (investigating the measurement of
word distribution). Prior to Yule, there is the suggestion that stylistic habits might be used
to detect authorship in a letter from the mathematician Augustus De Morgan in 1851. See
Farringdon, supra note 61, at 549 (citing SOPHIE ELIZABETH DE MORGAN, MEMOIR OF
AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN 215-16 (1882)). There is also the work on frequency distributions of
words by Zipf in 1932. See GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF, SELECTED STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN LANGUAGE (1932).
64. LOUIS TONKO MILIC, A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO THE STYLE OF JONATHAN
SWIFT (1967).
65. A.Q. MORTON & JAMES MCLEMAN, PAUL, THE MAN AND THE MYTH: A STUDY IN
THE AUTHORSHIP OF GREEK PROSE (1966).
66. ALVAR ELLEGÅRD, A STATISTICAL METHOD FOR DETERMINING AUTHORSHIP: THE
JUNIUS LETTERS, 1769-1772 (1962).
67. MOSTELLER & WALLACE, supra note 61; FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID L.
WALLACE, INFERENCE AND DISPUTED AUTHORSHIP: THE FEDERALIST (1964).
68. Among the extended treatments or collections of articles are J.F. BURROWS,
COMPUTATION INTO CRITICISM: A STUDY OF JANE AUSTEN’S NOVELS AND AN EXPERIMENT IN
METHOD (1987); THE COMPUTER IN LITERARY AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES (Alan Jones & R.F.
Churchhouse eds., 1976); PAULA R. FELDMAN & BUFORD NORMAN, THE WORDWORTHY
COMPUTER: CLASSROOM AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE
(1987); ANTHONY KENNY, THE COMPUTATION OF STYLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS
FOR STUDENTS OF LITERATURE AND HUMANITIES (1982); LITERARY COMPUTING AND
LITERARY CRITICISM: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ESSAYS ON THEME AND RHETORIC (Rosanne G. Potter ed., 1989); and A.Q. MORTON, LITERARY DETECTION: HOW TO PROVE
AUTHORSHIP AND FRAUD IN LITERATURE AND DOCUMENTS (1978). Current articles in the
field can be found in the journals Literary and Linguistic Computing and Computers and
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The question, then, is whether these techniques can be applied to
judicial opinions. The answer is not obviously in the affirmative.
The fact that Jane Austen’s or Ernest Hemmingway’s texts have
distinctive styles and are easily recognizable does not mean that the
writing styles of more ordinary mortals will be recognizable. Moreover, testing judicial authorship is potentially even more problematic
because of the institutionalized nature of judicial writing. To the extent that judges consciously try to follow some institutional style
(and, therefore, consciously suppress their own style), the difficulties
in identifying particular judicial authorship are likely further exacerbated.69 Our project, however, is to identify the degree of judge authorship versus clerk authorship.
There is reason to believe that judicial style is likely to be different from clerk style. Judges, who tend to have been experienced lawyers or academics earlier in their careers, are likely to be more confident in their writing than their clerks, who tend to be fresh out of
law schools. Judges, because of their high level of skill and confidence, may write shorter opinions with fewer citations and footnotes.
Judges also are likely to attack the central issue in their cases directly. Clerks, by contrast, because of their inexperience, may tend to
write lengthy opinions with numerous citations and footnotes.70
As noted earlier, the sole application of the linguistic techniques
discussed above to the question of judicial delegation to law clerks is
the paper by Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman.71 Court lore has it
that Justice Thurgood Marshall delegated writing tasks heavily to
his law clerks, whereas Justice Lewis Powell was more actively involved in the production of opinions.72 Wahlbeck and his coauthors
attempted to use information available from the Justices’ papers,
the Humanities. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 189 n.14 (suggesting these two journals and a number of the volumes mentioned above for background in statistical stylistics).
69. For a discussion of the types of judicial opinion styles and the background literature, see Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate
Opinions, 1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary
Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656-76 (2000).
70. The point that overreliance on law clerks can significantly influence the style of
opinions has been made by a number of commentators. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 94
(making the point that delegation of opinion writing to law clerks can affect the clarity and
style of the opinion); POSNER, supra note 41, at 115 (suggesting that the excessive numbers
of footnotes, citations, and words in opinions are all a product of heightened levels of delegation to law clerks); Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 173 (making the point that clerks
are more likely than judges to rely extensively on multifactor and balancing tests in the
opinions that they draft) (citing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993), and
POSNER, supra note 3). But see Samuel Estreicher, Conserving the Federal Judiciary for a
Conservative Agenda?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 569, 574 (1986) (agreeing that law clerks may be
partially responsible for the excessive numbers of footnotes and the deadening style of current opinions but also stating that part of the blame may also lie with computerization).
71. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42.
72. See id. at 170-72; see also sources cited supra note 42.
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containing clerk identifiers on bench memoranda and draft opinions,
to see whether they could detect the “fingerprints” of the clerks in the
opinions with which the two Justices were involved.73 The greater the
involvement of the Justice in the actual drafting, they hypothesized,
the less likely it would be that the fingerprints of the clerks would be
detectable.74 In order to perform the detection task, they used eight
different frequency measures.75 These were average footnote length,
average sentence length, average word length, word length diversity,
sentence length diversity, footnote frequency, type-token ratio, and
the once-word rate.76 Consistent with their initial hypothesis, Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman found that the fingerprints of judicial
clerks are clearer in Marshall’s opinions than in Powell’s opinions.
This implied that Powell had a greater hand in authoring his own judicial opinions.77
We attempt to adapt the authorship methodology used in computational linguistics to the task of ranking authorship rates for judges.
We note, however, several important points. Ideally, we could perform the following two step methodology:
Step 1: Run the authorship methodology on a set of authentic writing samples from a particular judge to serve as the baseline of comparison.
Step 2: Compare the judge’s judicial opinions against the authentic writing samples to determine whether the judge in fact authored
the opinions. The greater the discrepancy between the opinions and
the authentic writing samples, the less likely the probability that the
particular judge authored the opinions.
For most judges, there is unlikely to be an available set of authentic samples of the judge’s own writing that can be used to calculate
baseline frequencies.78 We therefore are unable to determine how
many of a particular judge’s opinions the judge actually wrote.
Nonetheless, at least two uses for the authorship methodology are
possible in judge-related authorship studies. First, we can make a
comparison of a subset of a particular judge’s opinions to each other.
73. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 168, 178-82.
74. See id. at 174.
75. Id. at 176-77.
76. Id. Type-token ratio is “the number of different words in an opinion (types) as a
percentage of the total number of words in the opinion (tokens).” Id. at 176. Once-word refers to “the relative frequency of words that appear exactly once in an opinion.” Id.
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. For a subset of judges such as former law professors, we can find articles that they
authored. There are two problems with using these articles as the basis for opinion testing.
First, article writing is a different genre from opinion writing; and second, law review editors are involved in article writing. That said, since it is these same law review editors who
often become law clerks, maybe opinion styles and law review article styles are more similar than we think.

1104

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1077

Assuming that consistency in the sentence patterns and other aspects of an author’s style is positively correlated with authentic authorship, one can then rank the judges relatively against one another.
If the judge authored all the opinions, presumably the opinions will
receive a high same-authorship score. If the judge did not author all
of the opinions, then the set of opinions will receive a low sameauthorship score.
This variation measure across a set of opinions for which a particular judge is named as the author, it should be cautioned, will provide a high score for a judge who delegates all her work to a single,
permanent law clerk.79 It would also likely give higher scores to
judges who imposed their styles on the writing process by doing
heavy editing as opposed to doing any of the actual writing. What we
would be measuring, then, is best described as the relative degree of
various judges’ involvement in the writing process.
Second, we can use the authorship methodology to make relative
comparisons of how authorship for a particular judge has changed
over time. We may not know if Judge A authors her opinions or not.
But we can see if the level of authorship (regardless of the starting
point) has declined or increased over time. Consider Supreme Court
Justices. One hypothesis is that as individual Justices age, they play
a diminishing role in writing their own opinions or, alternatively, in
monitoring the work product of their clerks.80 We could compare the
authorship score for a particular Justice when in her fifties against
the authorship score when in her eighties. If the hypothesis is correct, one would expect to see a relative drop in the same-authorship
score.
In this Essay we discuss only the first application of the authorship methodology to ranking judges (the judge versus judge comparison). Doing a full-scale ranking of any meaningful sample of judges is
beyond the scope of this project—and our research budgets. We do,
however, briefly report the results of some preliminary tests and discuss the limitations of our methodology as well as possible adjustments to improve on our work. We leave for another paper the comparison of judges relative to their past selves.81

79. Such a result is unlikely, nonetheless, where the sample of opinions for a judge
are drawn across multiple years (and thus involve multiple different sets of clerks).
80. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 11) (reporting evidence
on how the authorship patterns of Justices such as Rehnquist and Blackmun changed over
their time on the Court, with both Justices delegating more of the opinion writing to clerks
as they gained seniority).
81. We are in the process of collecting these data now.
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B. Ranking Judges
To test authorship rates, we start with a set of generic tests commonly used in other studies of authorship. We do not control for different types of documents in the generic tests but take instead a randomly selected set of opinions for a judge and compare them to one
another. We label these generic tests our “black-box” tests because of
the lack of subject matter controls.
The two black-box tests that we use are recognized authorshiptesting methods—only two out of a variety of tests available.82 We describe them briefly before discussing the results of the tests. We rely
primarily on the GZip compression technique, which compresses
documents based on the similarities in the basic linguistic building
blocks of the two files.83 The GZip algorithm looks for repeated
phrases within a threshold of the last 8000 characters of text analyzed (a number that can be made larger, depending on the specific
program). The longer and more frequent the repeated phrases, the
higher the score the algorithm accords to the text; the end result is
greater compression.
82. Among the many authorship attribution techniques are reduction of authorship
style to a single defining number, Markov chains, cumulative sums, and syntactic annotation. On these various methods, see Dmitri V. Khmelev & Fiona J. Tweedie, Using Markov
Chains for Identification of Writers, 16 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 299 (2001); Michael L. Hilton & David I. Homes, An Assessment of Cumulative Sum Charts for Authorship Attribution, 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 73 (1993); George K. Barr, The
Cusum Mechanism—A Review of Analysing for Authorship by Jill M. Farringdon, 6
EXPERT EVIDENCE 43 (1998); Harald Baayen et al., Outside the Cave of Shadows: Using
Syntactic Annotation to Enhance Authorship Attribution, 11 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC
COMPUTING 121 (1996); and Tony Honoré, Some Simple Measures of Richness of Vocabulary, 7 ASS’N LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING BULL. 172 (1979).
83. In using and applying the GZip method, we relied on the computer scientists at InApp software company in Trivandrum, India—Satish Babu, M.C. Jayakrishnan, and R.V.
Suchithra—who consulted with colleagues at the computer science department at Kerala
University to develop a simple application of the GZip method for our project. Should readers
be interested in more details on the GZip application, please email questions to: Satish Babu,
sb@inapp.com; M.C. Jayakrishnan, jayan@inapp.com; or R.V. Suchitra, suchi@inapp.com.
Our use of the compression method to test authorship is simplistic. For discussions of far
more sophisticated applications of the compression methodology to test for authorship that
are beyond the mathematics and statistics skills of the two authors here, see, for example,
Dario Benedetto et al., Language Trees and Zipping, 88 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 048702-1
(2002); Eibe Frank et al., Text Categorization Using Compression Models, in PROCEEDINGS:
DCC 2000 DATA COMPRESSION CONFERENCE 555 (James A. Storer & Martin Cohn eds., 2000);
D.V. Khmelev, Disputed Authorship Resolution Through Using Relative Empirical Entropy
for Markov Chains of Letters in Human Language Texts, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE LINGUISTICS 201
(2000); O.V. Kukushkina et al., Using Literal and Grammatical Statistics for Authorship Attribution, 37 PROBS. INFO. TRANSMISSION 172 (2001); and William J. Teahan & David J.
Harper, Using Compression-Based Language Models for Text Categorization (2001), available
at http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/teahan01using.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). Simphile, a program from Geneffects, is a commercial implementation of author recognition, using the same
technique. The methodology has also reportedly been used for gene sequence matching in bioinformatics and authorship of music and art. For more information, see GENEFFECTS,
SIMPHILE, at http://www.geneffects.com/simphile (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
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Compression serves as a metric for redundancy or “entropy”84 and,
as a result, is a metric for comparing authorship. The compression for
a combined file containing an English document combined with an
Italian one, for example, will be significantly less than that of a combined file containing two similar length documents in English.85 Along
those lines, research suggests that the compression of files from the
same authors will be significantly greater than that of files from different authors (due to the greater number of repeated phrases).
We can calculate a compression score for any two documents (labeled A and B) as follows:
Compression Score = P/Q
where:
Size(·) = The size in bytes of the compressed file
P = Size(Document A) + Size(Document B)
Q = Size(Documents A combined with B)
P is always greater than Q. If documents A and B are written by
the same author, we assert that P will be much greater than Q. Put
another way, if documents A and B display many similarities, compressing the combination of the two documents will result in significant space savings when compared with the compression of each
document separately. On the other hand, if the documents are written by different authors, P will, in the extreme, approach Q (as the
compression program will find fewer common phrases between the
documents). If documents A and B are completely different, then
combining the two will result in no additional compression.
For each of the ninety-eight judges in our sample, we collected
four text samples of 8000 characters each. Text samples were chosen
at random from opinions at least 32,000 characters in length that
were written between 1998 and 2000.86 In our black-box tests, we did
not control for the subject matter of the opinion. A particular judge
may have four criminal law opinions or, alternatively, a set of crimi84. For a discussion on the meaning of entropy in the context of authorship, see
Benedetto et al., supra note 83, at 048702-1 to 048702-2.
85. See id. at 048702-2.
86. The actual selection of files to run the tests was made at random by the programmers at InApp, with no interference from us other than the request that the selection be
made randomly (using a random number generator to select four opinions for each judge).
The only possible bias in the selection of the opinions is in their size, in that the opinions in
our selection pool had to have a minimum size of 32,000 characters (because that size
would generally yield at least 8000 characters after cleaning). This was not a problem in
terms of majority opinions because most judges have a large number of opinions of 32,000
characters. But when we attempted to run the program on dissenting opinions we ran into
the bias problem because most judges had very few dissenting opinions of 32,000 characters or more. For that reason, we did not attempt to do a full study of the differences between dissents and majority opinions, something that could potentially yield interesting
results. See infra note 89 (discussing how the comparison of scores on dissents versus those
on majority opinions could serve as a test of the methodology).

2005]

WHICH JUDGES WRITE THEIR OWN OPINIONS

1107

nal, constitutional, commercial, and securities-regulatory opinions.
As we discuss below, however, this lack of control for the type of opinion may introduce genre-specific “noise” in our results. The compression score for four criminal law opinions from a judge who does not
write her own opinions may be greater (leading to a higher sameauthorship score) than the score for four opinions from different areas of the law for a judge who does in fact write her own opinions.
Since the goal was to test authorship style, we eliminated all portions of the documents that were not a product of this style. That
meant removing all West headnotes, citations, and quotes from each
document. Commonly used words such as “and” and “the” were also
eliminated.87 Cleaning the documents was the most time-consuming
task in this project because it had to be done manually. It took us 500plus hours of research-assistant time to clean the pieces of text that
satisfied our conditions for each of the ninety-eight judges in our sample. Cleaning the documents is not strictly required but does reduce
the level of noise in the same-authorship score results, since, for example, two judges with dramatically different levels of “true” authorship may receive the same GZip score if the compression of the words
“and” and “the” swamp all other differences between the documents.
We then made pairwise comparisons of these four pieces of text
(labeled A1, A2, A3, and A4 below) and generated a four-by-four matrix for each judge with P/Q scores for each of the pairs:
A1, A1

A1, A2

A1, A3

A1, A4

A2, A1

A2, A2

A2, A3

A2, A4

A3, A1

A3, A2

A3, A3

A3, A4

A4, A1

A4, A2

A4, A3

A4, A4

Our goal was to measure the degree of variation in the writing
style (here, measured by compression levels as determined using the
GZip program). One measure of this variance is provided by the eigenvalue of the matrix.88 The higher the eigenvalue, the higher the
probability of sole authorship.
87. This is not to suggest that these commonly used words might not be useful with a
different type of authorship test. One could, for example, run frequency tests on the relative uses of these common words, because different authors likely have different styles
with respect to these words as well (some authors likely use more of them than others).
One rationale for using measures of these “function” words (such as “and,” “the,” and “of”)
is that the rate of their use is a function of the unconscious or habitual element of writing
and, therefore, a better indicator of true authorship. For discussions, see J.F. Burrows,
Word-Patterns and Story-Shapes: The Statistical Analysis of Narrative Style, 2 LITERARY &
LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 61 (1987), and David L. Hoover, Statistical Stylistics and Authorship Attribution: An Empirical Investigation, 16 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 421
(2001).
88. The four-by-four matrix of compression scores for each judge’s four opinions is
symmetric, since P/Q will be the same for the pairs [A1, A2] and [A2, A1]. By definition, a
symmetric square matrix possesses n real eigenvalues (where n is the order of the ma-
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To test the effectiveness of the GZip methodology for determining
judicial authorship, we identified a set of judges who, a priori, are
known to write their own opinions—our “test” judges. An informal
survey of more than two dozen judges and law clerks, who requested
that we not name them, produced a high degree of agreement on the
names of three federal circuit court judges who regularly author their
opinions: Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Michael Boudin.89
More specifically, we were told that Posner drafts every word of his
opinions; that Easterbrook may allow his clerks to draft one or two
opinions a year but drafts the remainder himself; and that Boudin
uses a combination of very heavy editing of clerk drafts and selfauthorship. To reiterate, all three are reputed to fall on the high end
of the scale of self-authorship. Assuming this informal information to
be correct, the scores for these judges should be among the highest. If
the GZip methodology is effective in identifying judges who author
their own opinions, our three test judges should rank highly among
our sample of ninety-eight judges. We do not perform the alternative
test of identifying several judges reputed not to write their own opinions and assessing whether the GZip methodology succeeds in assigning a poor ranking to such judges. Unfortunately, for purposes of our
tests, the judges and clerks we surveyed were reluctant to identify
those least inclined to author their opinions.
We report in Table 1 below the ranking of the top fifteen judges
out of our sample of ninety-eight judges based on the eigenvalue
score from our GZip test. Higher eigenvalues correlate with a greater
likelihood of self-authorship. In addition, we report the ranking of
our three test judges.
trix). Eigenvalues have several applications. In this context, we use it as a single metric
that measures the variability among the elements of the matrix. We borrowed the reasoning for using eigenvalues from factor analysis, where they are used to measure variability.
89. A fuller study would need to use additional controls, particularly if there is doubt
about whether Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin actually author the major portion of their
own opinions. Two possible other controls are checking whether the authorship tests return higher scores for (a) dissents than for majority opinions, because informal information
suggests that dissents are more personal to the judge and, we assume, more likely to be
self-authored and (b) judges in the distant past than for judges of today, because judges in
the distant past are reputed to have written a far larger fraction of their own opinions
since they did not face the caseload pressures of current judges. We did not use either of
these two controls because of inadequacies in our dataset. On the points about dissents being more personal and judges in the past writing more of their own opinions, see Blomquist, supra note 6, at 86-92 (discussing the characteristics of dissent styles); Richman &
Reynolds, supra note 8, at 278-79 (discussing how the increases in caseloads from the time
of Learned Hand to the present have resulted in increased levels of delegation of the opinion-writing task); Frankel, supra note 3 (bemoaning the passing of the Leaned Hand style
of opinion writing, where there was little delegation of the writing task to the law clerks);
cf. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 168 (pointing out that the conventional view that
judges in the past single-handedly crafted all their own opinions whereas today’s judges
lean heavily on their clerks is an oversimplification, because there is evidence suggesting
that clerks have long played a significant role in the opinion-drafting process).
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TABLE 1
RANKING BASED ON GZIP METHODOLOGY
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT

OPINIONS EIGENVALUE

1

Randolph, A. Raymond

DC

169.01

2

Ginsburg, Douglas H.

DC

160.29

3

Manion, Daniel A.

7

150.58

4

Garza, Emilio M.

5

145.91

5

McKee, Theodore A.

3

140.23

6

Moore, Karen Nelson

6

139.44

7

Tjoflat, Gerald Bard

11

137.95

8

Batchelder, Alice M.

6

137.46

9

Calabresi, Guido

2

137.03

10

Flaum, Joel M.

7

135.83

11

Walker, John M., Jr.

2

135.00

12

Gilman, Ronald Lee

6

134.86

13

Dennis, James L.

5

134.82

14

DeMoss, Harold R., Jr.

5

134.57

15

Ebel, David M.

10

134.48

.

.

.

44

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

130.19

50

Posner, Richard A.

7

129.89

97

Boudin, Michael

1

121.81

.

Somewhat surprisingly (and to our dismay after expending 500
hours of resources), none of our three test judges show up as top scorers on the GZip tests. Boudin, in fact, scores near the very bottom of
the judges, and only Easterbrook is in the top half of judges.
We provide one variation on the GZip methodology. Instead of
computing the eigenvalue of the four-by-four matrix of GZip scores,
we classify the compression score for any two opinions for a particular judge as either high, middle, or low.90 We then look at the difference between the number of high compression scores (high likelihood
of sole authorship) and the number of low compression scores (low
90. We take the lower triangular numbers of the four-by-four matrix (the upper triangular numbers can be ignored since the matrix is symmetric, while the diagonal can be ignored since it represents a self-referential relation). The overall range of the P/Q compression numbers across all judges goes from 3.0 to 6.0. We classify each score in the lower triangular portion of the matrix into one of three qualitative groups as follows:
Low
Medium
High

3.0 – 4.2
4.2 – 4.8
4.8 – 6.0
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likelihood of sole authorship) while ignoring the middle scores. We
predict that judges who self-author their opinions will tend to receive
a much greater number of high-compression-score opinions, after netting out all the low-compression-score opinions. Table 2 reports the
rankings based on this GZip variation.
TABLE 2
RANKING BASED ON NUMBER OF HIGH - LOW GZIP SCORES
RANK

JUDGE

1

Randolph, A. Raymond

2

Manion, Daniel A.

2

Ginsburg, Douglas H.

CIRCUIT

NUMBER OF HIGH COMPRESSION
SCORES MINUS NUMBER OF LOW
COMPRESSION SCORES

DC

3

7

2

DC

2

2

Garza, Emilio M.

5

2

2

McKee, Theodore A.

3

2

2

Cole, R. Guy, Jr.

6

2

2

Gilman, Ronald Lee

6

2

2

Sentelle, David B.

DC

2

2

Tashima, A. Wallace

9

2

10

Ebel, David M.

10

1

10

Tjoflat, Gerald Bard

11

1

10

Posner, Richard A.

7

1

13

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

0

13

O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F.

9

0

13

Rovner, Ilana Diamond

7

0

.

.

.

Boudin, Michael

1

-5

.
98

As with the initial GZip methodology, our test judges fail to score
consistently well in the GZip score variation. Posner scores in the top
fifteen, coming in tied at number ten with three other judges.
Easterbrook also scores highly, tied at thirteenth. Forty-seven other
judges, however, are also tied at thirteenth. Boudin is the lowestranked judge in terms of authorship. Given the small number of each
judge’s opinions that we examined, differences among judges in the
GZip variation are not great enough to make fine-tuned distinctions
among judges. Our first cut at both black-box tests resulted in failure: Neither GZip test produced results consistent with our a priori
information that Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin author their own
opinions more than other circuit court judges.
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What does the foregoing suggest? First, it may be that the small
sample of data that we used for each judge, four randomly selected
opinions, was inadequate. We may need to use a larger set of opinions for each judge for the black-box tests to have any traction. Moreover, our opinions are all selected within a narrow time frame (1998
to 2000). A high authorship score for a particular judge may indicate
that the same clerk wrote some, if not all, of the four opinions for the
judge. Choosing opinions spread out across a longer time frame will
reduce the possibility that a high authorship score is due, in fact, to a
particular clerk.
Second, the fact is that legal writing in a particular subject matter
area contains genre-specific language. Tests such as the GZip algorithm look for similar word patterns. Legal opinion writing is likely
to have considerable genre-specific commonality. The vast majority of
opinions are likely to mention phrases such as “standard of review”
or “summary judgment” or “motion to dismiss.” If there are enough of
these common phrases in all the opinions, they may swamp the calculations. Put differently, legal opinion writing as a genre may have
such a distinct style that genre-specific tests must be devised for it.
C. White-Box Tests
Our simple black-box tests without subject matter controls failed
to distinguish judges based on the degree of authorship. While the
black-box tests worked well in comparing generic texts with one another, we suspect that they failed in the judicial context due to the
specialized nature of many types of judicial opinions. Opinions of the
same genre, for example, may use various forms of jargon and other
common phrases that are shared in the opinions of different judges.
Even judges who do not self-author their own opinions will receive a
high same-authorship score for opinions within the same genre.
Despite the failure of our simple black-box tests, we contend that
additional tests geared to controlling for the subject matter of specific
opinions may still work to distinguish judges based on the degree of
opinion authorship. We call these tests our “white-box” tests. At least
three categories of white-box tests are possible based on citation
practices, language patterns, and a more nuanced version of the
black-box GZip methodologies.
1. Citation Practices
Citations are a key element in the crafting of judicial opinions.
Judges who write their own opinions may display specific patterns in
the opinions they cite, tending to cite opinions with which they are
more familiar. We perhaps acted too hastily in cleaning the opinions
used in our black-box tests of the citations to other opinions. The pat-
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terns of citations themselves provide crucial information on authorship. Other things equal, two opinions with the same citation patterns (for example, citing the same set of opinions) are more likely to
be authored by the same author than two opinions without the same
citation pattern.
One type of citation pattern involves self-citations. Landes, Lessig,
and Solimine conjecture that judges who write their own opinions are
likely to be more familiar with these opinions, which would lead to
greater self-citation rates.91 Law clerks, by contrast, are likely to
simply conduct Westlaw searches or draw from the parties’ briefs. A
higher average number of self-citations per opinion is therefore likely
to correlate with a greater likelihood of authorship.
Importantly, self-citation patterns are at least somewhat invariant with the subject matter of an opinion. A judge who tends to cite
her own work will cite her own criminal law cases when writing a
subsequent criminal law opinion and her own securities law cases
when writing a subsequent securities law opinion. Subject matter
may, nonetheless, still be important if a judge writes opinions in a
particular area more frequently because she will, as a result, cite her
own opinions in that area more frequently.
As a quick test of the hypothesis that self-citation rates correlate
with authorship, we examine the self-citation patterns using our
1998 to 2000 dataset. We focus in particular on whether the three
test judges reputed to author their own opinions are among the top
scorers on self-citations. Table 3, infra, reports the self-citation rates
ranking for our test judges and the top fifteen scorers in our ranking.
The self-citation rate is defined as the average number of selfcitations (measured from 1998 to 2003) to each judge’s opinions written in the 1998 to 2000 sample time period. Because we focus on each
judge’s opinions from the same three-year period, each judge starts
with a similar pool of opinions that they may self-cite. In addition,
the use of a pool of opinions from the same time period controls for
changes in self-citation patterns over time.

91. See Landes et al., supra note 14, at 274 (“It is not implausible that judges who
write their own opinions will cite themselves more frequently than judges who do not—if
only because they have a greater familiarity with their own prior opinions.”).
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TABLE 3
RANKING BASED ON SELF-CITATION RATE
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT

AVERAGE
SELFCITATIONS
TO EACH
OPINION

T-TEST OF
DIFFERENCE WITH THE
MEDIAN JUDGE*
(EQUAL VARIANCES)

1

2.44

7.00**

1

Selya, Bruce M.

2

Wollman, Roger L.

8

1.56

3.93**

3

Lynch, Sandra L.

1

1.48

4.15**

4

Posner, Richard A.

7

1.46

2.81**

5

Clay, Eric L.

6

1.40

4.44**

6

Carnes, Ed

11

1.31

4.02**

7

Garland, Merrick B.

DC

1.31

4.52**

8

Moore, Karen Nelson

6

1.23

3.12**

9

Kelly, Paul J., Jr.

10

1.12

3.13**

10

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

1.10

2.04**

11

Ebel, David M.

10

1.08

2.73**

12

Coffey, John L.

7

1.03

2.15**

13

Murphy, Michael R.

10

1.03

2.61**

14

Kanne, Michael S.

7

1.02

2.07**

15

Marcus, Stanley

11

1.02

3.21**

.
27

.

.

.

.

Boudin, Michael

1

0.61

0.89

* The median judge (Mary Beck Briscoe) is chosen as the forty-ninth
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges.
** Indicates a significance level of 5%. The self-citation rate for Mary
Beck Briscoe was 0.35 to each opinion.

In Table 3, we observe that both Posner and Easterbrook are in the
top ten judges out of the sample of ninety-eight circuit court judges in
terms of self-citation rates. Boudin, on the other hand, is ranked twentyseventh, although he still is in the top half of all judges. For each judge,
we perform a two-sided t-test assuming equal variances between that
judge’s self-citation rate and the median judge’s—Mary Beck Briscoe—
self-citation rate. All the top fifteen judges are significantly different at
the five percent confidence level from the median judge.
Note that the t-statistic test we perform in comparison with the
median judge does not tell us anything about whether Posner’s authorship score is significantly different from the next-ranked judge
(Clay). When we compare Posner against Clay, we do not find any
statistically significant difference. Nevertheless, assuming that authorship is a positive, part of our goal in ranking judges is to incen-
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tivize all judges to exert greater effort in authoring their judicial
opinions. Even if no statistically significant difference exists between
any two particular judges, the ranking will induce judges to exert effort. So long as greater effort increases the likelihood that a judge
will rank higher than another judge (even if not with statistical significance), the judge will have an incentive to exert more effort.92
Second, we examine invocation rates. An invocation is a citation
whereby the judge is mentioned in the citing opinion by name (other than
a perfunctory use of the name as, say, part of a parenthetical indication
that the judge authored a particular dissenting or concurring opinion).93
Higher invocation rates for a judge’s opinions, we posit, correlate with a
higher likelihood that the invoked judge authored her own opinions.
How are invocations related to authorship? We assume that judges
have institutional knowledge as to which of their colleagues write their
own opinions. Because an invocation represents a special indication of
respect to the judge being cited (ordinarily judges are not referred to by
name), it is unlikely that the special respect will be given unless the
judge in question is one who writes her own opinions.94 Put differently, a
judge who is known to delegate the majority of her opinions to the clerks
92. Judges may write opinions of different length. The longer the opinion, the greater
the likelihood that the opinion will receive a self-citation (due, for example, to the greater
amount of analysis in a longer opinion). To control for this possibility, we also ranked the
judges in our sample based on the average number of self-citations to each written opinion
page. We provide the ranking below.
AVERAGE SELF-CITATIONS
TO EACH OPINION PAGE
1
Wollman, Roger L.
8
0.3393
2
Posner, Richard A.
7
0.3283
3
Bruce M. Selya
1
0.3230
4
Easterbrook, Frank H.
7
0.2520
5
Kelly, Paul J., Jr.
10
0.1873
6
Lynch, Sandra L.
1
0.1673
7
Carnes, Ed
11
0.1612
8
Moore, Karen Nelson
6
0.1600
9
Clay, Eric L.
6
0.1443
10
Coffey, John L.
7
0.1378
11
Garland, Merrick B.
DC
0.1343
12
Tacha, Deanell Reece
10
0.1334
13
Kanne, Michael S.
7
0.1331
14
Ebel, David M.
10
0.1296
15
Ripple, Kenneth F.
7
0.1246
.
.
.
.
20
Boudin, Michael
1
0.1016
Note that Posner and Easterbrook do even better than in the self-citation rate per opinion
measure. Boudin also does better, but still remains outside the top fifteen.
93. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 58-61 (defining invocations and analyzing
judges based on the rates at which their names are invoked in other opinions).
94. See Landes et al., supra note 14, at 274 (“It is also not implausible that judges
who write their own opinions will be more influential, since their opinions will be more
consistent and, if good, then more consistently good than opinions written by law clerks.”).
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT
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is unlikely to find her judicial colleagues invoking her. They may cite the
judge, if her opinion is on point, but will be unlikely to invoke her and
thereby give her a special measure of respect.95
Invocation rates are at least somewhat robust to the subject matter
of opinions. A judge who is held in high regard among other judges will
tend to receive invocations for all types of opinions. Nonetheless, subject
matter will not be completely irrelevant to the extent that judges do
tend to invoke other judges for specific types of opinions (for example,
Easterbrook on corporate and commercial-related law). Table 4 reports
the results from the invocation rate ranking. A judge’s invocation rate is
defined as the average number of invocations (measured from 1998 to
2003) of each judge’s opinions written in the 1998 to 2000 time period.
TABLE 4
RANKING BASED ON INVOCATION RATE
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT

AVERAGE
INVOCATIONS
TO EACH

T-TEST OF DIFFERENCE WITH THE
MEDIAN JUDGE*
(EQUAL VARIANCES)

1

Posner, Richard A.

7

OPINION
0.664

2

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

0.442

3.78**

3

Calabresi, Guido

2

0.228

3.08**
2.59**

6.34**

4

Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III

4

0.185

5

Edmondson, J.L.

11

0.138

1.17

6

Higginbotham, Patrick E.

5

0.124

1.34

7

Luttig, J. Michael

4

0.124

1.14

8

Jones, Edith H.

5

0.109

0.98

9

Boudin, Michael

1

0.096

1.30

10

Walker, John M., Jr.

2

0.095

1.11

11

Clay, Eric L.

6

0.086

0.83

12

Cabranes, José A.

2

0.086

0.92

13

Kleinfeld, Andrew J.

9

0.085

0.86

14

Tjoflat, Gerald Bard

11

0.083

0.55

15

King, Carolyn Dineen

5

0.082

0.77

* The median judge (Terence T. Evans) is chosen as the forty-ninth
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges.
** Indicates a significance level of 5%. The invocation rate for
Terence T. Evans was 0.039 to each opinion.

95. On this special measure of respect that accrues to those judges doing their own
work, Justice Brandeis famously said that “[t]he reason the public thinks so much of the
Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who
do their own work.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 116 (5th ed. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John G. Kester,
The Law Clerk Explosion, LITIGATION, Spring 1983, at 20, 62.
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All three of the test judges score in the top ten in terms of invocation rates. Indeed, Posner and Easterbrook are numbers one and two,
respectively, in the ranking. Both Posner and Easterbrook’s scores, in
addition, are significantly different from the median judge’s (Terence
T. Evans) score. Posner’s and Easterbrook’s high t-statistics indicate
that they are relatively more likely to self-author compared to the
median judge in a statistically significant manner. Some evidence exists that a ranking based on invocation rates may distinguish among
judges based on their self-authorship of judicial opinions. Nonetheless, reputation may reflect a judge’s long-term self-authorship pattern rather than the degree of authorship in any particular set of
contemporary opinions.
Judges who write their own opinions, in addition to being more
likely to cite themselves, might also be more likely to cite a smaller
number of other judges relative to the average citation pattern.
Judges are likely to have a more fine-tuned sense of which of the
other judges are worthy of citation than their law clerks. Once a
judge identifies her set of preferred other judges, the judge is likely to
stick with them in her citation pattern, leading to a relatively low
level of variance in citations. On the other hand, where clerks author
the opinions, they will not necessarily cite to the same set of judges
but may cite to widely differing judges. The variation in the number
of different judges cited, therefore, will likely be higher with a judge
who delegates extensively compared with a judge who tends to author her own opinions. Because our 1998 to 2000 dataset does not
contain information on the specific identities of judges that a particular judge cites, we are unable to test whether variance in citation performs well in distinguishing our a priori set of judges who are reputed to self-author their opinions. We leave this test to another paper.96
2. Subject Matter-Neutral Language Patterns
The writing of judges who author their own opinions will likely
display patterns. While specific word patterns (for example, use of
the phrase “habeas corpus”) may be subject matter-specific, some
patterns may not depend on the subject matter of a judicial opinion.
The use of these genre-neutral patterns provides an alternative
“white-box” method of testing for authorship.
For example, some judges will tend to write short opinions and
others will write longer ones. Some will use extended quotes and others will not. When judges delegate to clerks, however, there will
likely be greater variation in the types of opinions because clerks will

96. We are in the process of collecting these data now.

2005]

WHICH JUDGES WRITE THEIR OWN OPINIONS

1117

have their own styles. For some fixed number of opinions, a judge
who writes her own opinions is likely to have a smaller opinion-size
variation than a judge who does not. In our opinion, neither the
length of the opinion (or average paragraph or sentence) nor the use
of block quotes are necessarily tied to any specific subject matter or
area of the law.
For each of the ninety-eight judges in our sample, we calculated
the standard deviation of the length of each majority opinion based
on published pages in the West Federal Reporter and excluding the
summary and West keynotes. The standard deviation of majorityopinion length is for opinions from the 1998 to 2000 time period for
each judge. Table 5 reports the judges’ rankings based on the standard deviation of majority-opinion length.
TABLE 5
RANKING BASED ON STANDARD DEVIATION
OF MAJORITY-OPINION LENGTH
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT

STANDARD DEVIATION OF MAJORITYOPINION LENGTH

F-TEST PVALUE*

1

Loken, James B.

8

1.81

0.0000

2

Posner, Richard A.

7

1.84

0.0000

3

Martin, Boyce F., Jr.

6

1.84

0.0087

4

Wollman, Roger L.

8

1.92

0.0002

5

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

1.99

0.0002

6

Black, Susan H.

11

2.21

0.0277

7

Arnold, Morris S.

8

2.25

0.0044

8

Boudin, Michael

1

2.33

0.0091

9

Ginsburg, Douglas H.

DC

2.37

0.0267

10

Hawkins, Michael Daly

9

2.51

0.0636

11

Schroeder, Mary M.

9

2.53

0.0586

12

Tashima, A. Wallace

9

2.64

0.0707

13

Walker, John M., Jr.

2

2.64

0.0638

14

Nygaard, Richard L.

3

2.67

0.1243

15

Sentelle, David B.

DC

2.73

0.1146

* The F-test provides a test of the null hypothesis that the standard
deviation of opinion length for a particular judge is the same as the
standard deviation for the median judge (Deanell Reece Tacha). The
standard deviation of opinion length for Deanell Reece Tacha was
3.65.

1118

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1077

As with the self-citation rate and invocation rate tests, Posner
and Easterbrook score in the top-ten judges. In addition, Boudin—
who was in the top ten for the invocation rate test but not for the
self-citation rate test—is also ranked among the top-ten judges
based on a lower standard deviation of opinion length. The differences between the standard deviation scores for Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin compared with the score for the median judge
(Deanell Reece Tacha) are significant at the one percent level. The
standard deviation of the majority-opinion length for the judges
successfully distinguished our test judges in terms of both high
rank among our sample judges and comparison with the median
judge.
We also hypothesize that judges who write their own opinions
will produce shorter opinions with fewer quotes. They have a limited amount of time, and a large amount of work, and they are
more confident about what they are saying. In Table 6, infra, we
provide a ranking of our ninety-eight judges according to average
length of majority opinions during the 1998-2000 time period. The
length of each opinion is based on published pages in the West
Federal Reporter excluding the summary and West keynotes. The
average printed pages per majority opinion is equal to the total
length of all opinions for a particular judge divided by the number
of opinions written from 1998 to 2000.
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TABLE 6
RANKING BASED ON AVERAGE PAGES PER MAJORITY OPINION
RANK

JUDGE

CIRCUIT

AVERAGE
PRINTED
PAGES PER
OPINION
3.94

T-TEST OF
DIFFERENCE WITH
THE MEDIAN JUDGE*
(UNEQUAL
VARIANCES)
-10.14**

1

Arnold, Morris S.

8

2

Easterbrook, Frank H.

7

4.38

-9.47**

3

Posner, Richard A.

7

4.44

-9.51**

4

Loken, James B.

5

Ginsburg, Douglas H.

8

4.48

-9.06**

DC

4.65

-7.22**

6

Wollman, Roger L.

8

4.66

-8.48**

7

Martin, Boyce F., Jr.

6

4.73

-6.84**

8

Schroeder, Mary M.

9

4.93

-6.20**

9

Black, Susan H.

11

5.04

-5.86**

10

Bowman, Pasco M.

8

5.17

-5.91**

11

Murphy, Diana E.

8

5.32

-5.27**

12

Evans, Terence T.

7

5.36

-5.76**

13

Higginbotham, Patrick E.

5

5.65

-4.49**

14

Kozinski, Alex

9

5.70

-3.17**

15

Edmondson, J.L.

11

6.00

-3.08**

.

.

.

.

Boudin, Michael

1

6.09

-4.17**

.
18

* The median judge (Paul V. Niemeyer) is chosen as the forty-ninth
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges. Niemeyer had an average majority opinion length of 7.67 pages.
** Indicates a significance level of 5%.

Posner and Easterbrook again appear among the top-ten judges in
terms of likelihood of self-authorship. Boudin, however, falls out of
the top ten and is ranked number eighteen, but still within the toptwenty judges. The average majority-opinion page length for all three
test judges was significantly lower than the average page length for
the median judge (Paul V. Niemeyer) as deduced using a two-sided ttest assuming unequal variances.
Other frequency-based tests may prove feasible. A judge writing
an opinion will be less likely to footnote her opinion heavily than the
law clerk.97 Clerks, because of their lower knowledge base, higher
level of insecurity, and law review training, are more likely to feel a
need to footnote the document. We predict, therefore, that a lower

97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (citing Posner, who hypothesizes that
clerks will use more footnotes).
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number of footnotes per opinion (or per page) correlates with a higher
likelihood of self-authorship.98
3. Revisiting the Black-Box Tests
We and others may learn from the failure of our initial run at the
“black-box” GZip-based tests. In order to take advantage of genrespecific information and to control for genre-specific commonalities
across opinions written by different authors, at least three changes to
our methodology are possible.
First, to control for the possibility that a particular clerk may
dominate a judge’s opinion writing for a specific year, the sample of
opinions for each judge should span a relatively long time period—
certainly greater than the three years covered by our 1998 to 2000
time period. Increasing the number of opinions for each judge—from
four to ten, for example—may also provide traction to the GZip results.
Second, as discussed above, we were too zealous in our desire to
remove unnecessary information from our opinions. The informativeness of the opinions (on the issue of authorship) would likely have
been greater if we had kept the citation information. Keeping citation
information also greatly reduces the work required in preparing opinions for the GZip-based tests.
Third, a study could control for the noise generated from comparing opinions across different areas of the law. Suppose Judge A
writes her own opinions while Judge B does not. If we compared four
98. We used two other less sophisticated methods based on the publicly available Litstat program. For the Litstat tool on the Internet, see Matthew Bielich, LitStat, at
http://www.pinionsolutions.com/litstat/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Authors with distinctive styles and patterns are assumed to use similar types of sentence and word structures
in all of their writing. Using the Litstat program, we calculated the alphabetical frequency
of a text, that is, the frequency with which the words in that text begin with a certain letter of the alphabet. Frequency of commonly used words is an indicator of the specificity of
style. Thus, each author is likely to have a set of words that he or she may use more frequently than other authors. A frequency distribution of words could thus be an indicator of
the stylistic uniqueness. For each judge we used two samples of text of 8000 characters
each. As with our other black-box tests, we did not control for the subject matter of the judicial opinions. As with the GZip test, we cleaned the text. Here, however, we did not take
out common words such as “and” and “the,” because the information as to those commonly
used words is actually important to these supplementary tests. The alphabetical distribution of the words in the opinions is the output of the tool. This output is copied to a spreadsheet, and the average of the difference of these values for the two opinions is calculated—
the lower the average, the higher the probability of sole authorship. None of our three control judges were in the top fifteen judges in terms of probability of sole authorship. We also
used the Litstat program to calculate the average sentence length in a fixed amount of text
(8000 characters, after the text has been cleaned for citations, quotes, West headnotes and
other extraneous information). We predicted that the variance in these frequencies would
be smaller among documents authored by the same author than among those authored by
different authors. Only Boudin scored in the top fifteen judges (at number two) in terms of
probability of sole authorship.
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opinions by Judge A on diverse areas of the law (including, for example, criminal law, bankruptcy law, administrative law, and securities
regulation) against four opinions by Judge B on securities regulation,
Judge B will likely receive a higher same-authorship score. Such a
pattern, possible where opinions are randomly selected without regard to subject matter, may introduce noise into the analysis.
A simple control for such noise would be to select randomly opinions from the same subject matter area of the law—criminal law, for
example. It is possible that the common phrases in criminal law opinions (for example, “habeas corpus”) are so frequent that all judges
will receive the identical same-authorship score even with this control. Nonetheless, to the extent that, after taking into account the
common baseline vocabulary, judges do have idiosyncratic writing
styles, the GZip methodologies should pick up on these differences in
determining authorship.
We leave implementing these white-box controls to the black-box
tests for the genre-specific nature of opinions for our next paper.
IV. CONCLUSION: OTHER POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF AUTHORSHIP
TECHNOLOGY
This Essay only touches the surface of the world of technology that
might be applied to determine judicial authorship of opinions. The
results of the white-box tests are but a preliminary step toward determining authorship. Even assuming that these white-box tests
have a significant amount of explanatory power to determine authorship, each of the white-box tests measures something that, at best,
correlates with authorship. We suspect that meaningful progress in
this area will require a serious collaborative research effort between
legal academics and scholars in computational linguistics. Such technology, once developed, has the potential to assist in areas other than
research on the judiciary. We list a couple below.
A. Securities Fraud Complaints
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 to combat frivolous litigation.99 Proponents of the Act argued
that plaintiffs’ attorneys literally cut-and-pasted complaints together
to file suit against any company that experienced a large drop in
stock price, regardless of whether any real evidence of fraud ex-

99. For a discussion of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the
impact of the Act on both frivolous and meritorious claims, see STEPHEN J. CHOI, DO THE
MERITS MATTER LESS AFTER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT? (N.Y.U.
Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-04, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=558285.
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isted.100 Congress intended the Reform Act to force plaintiffs’ attorneys to take more care in their filings and provide particularized factual assertions as to why fraud in fact exists.
We may be able to use the authorship methodology to determine
how “close” two securities fraud complaints are to one another. If a
complaint is really a cut-and-paste job, the complaint is likely to receive a high same-authorship score when compared to other securities complaints from the same law firm. If the Reform Act resulted in
more particularized investigation before the filing of a complaint, we
predict that a set of pre-Reform complaints from the same law firm
would produce a higher same-authorship score as compared to a set
of post-Reform complaints from the same law firm.
B. Boilerplate Contract Evolution
The contracts used in a variety of settings such as the corporate
bond area are commonly described as boilerplate. In other words,
essentially the same standard language gets repeated in every contract in the market. Even if individual drafters do not know what
the contract language means, it gets repeated because everyone
else in the market is using it. Problems can arise when, in the
course of a dispute, the two sides assert different meanings for
some piece of ambiguous language whose original understanding
has long since been lost.
Authorship testing programs may be used to trace the original
source of the later contracts. Finding the source is potentially important for at least two reasons. First, from a practical disputeresolution point of view, knowing the original understanding might
help resolve the current dispute (to the extent the judge decides
that the original understanding should govern). Second, from a research point of view, the ability to track the evolution of contract
language can help us understand how contract language evolves,
how it becomes boilerplate, and what circumstances produce
changes in boilerplate.101

100. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1996) (discussing one
plaintiff’s attorney’s reference to Philip Morris’ success in the “toy industry” as evidence of
cut-and-paste complaints) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
101. For an empirical examination of how standardized sovereign bond covenants have
evolved over time (not using authorship methodology), see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds,
53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004).

